Salami-Slicing in the Sea: Should we be worried about China?
https://unsplash.com/photos/sliced-meats-and-meat-clever-6JQMjhqpVhE
Edited by Arya Kumar, Elizabeth Adams, Owen Andrews, and Sarah Ahmad
China has unveiled plans to increase its global sea power within the East and South China seas. The country’s most recent five-year policy plan, adopted in late October 2025, underscored China’s commitment to securing its marine periphery through integrated land-sea governance and innovation in marine science. There exists a visible worry by citizens and governments alike of various countries that such expansion may threaten a stable global order. Across Asia, countries from Japan to the Philippines have experienced China's maritime aggression firsthand and are fearful that China is undertaking a strategy known as salami-slicing, utilizing small, almost imperceptible acts that will eventually snowball over time into substantial change. Is this an accurate description of Chinese maritime behavior? Or are the worries over China overblown? To answer this question, let’s look at the ways by which China handles, mediates, or initiates marine conflict between itself and its neighbors at sea.
Japan
The most notable marine conflict between Japan and China is situated in the Senkaku Islands. The Senkaku Islands, located 410 kilometers from Japan's Okinawa Islands and about 300 kilometers from the Chinese mainland, are currently administered by Japan but claimed by China, who calls them Diaoyu. The area consists of five uninhabited islets and three reefs and is thought to possess large oil reserves and other valuable resources. Maintaining control over the islands is the basis for claims to the East China Sea, including the estimated 22 million barrels of petroleum and other liquids and 482 billion cubic feet of natural gas located within it, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. China only began asserting its claim over the area after oil and gas reserves were discovered in the 1970s.
China’s infringement on the Senkakus is mainly through vessels entering Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding the islands without obtaining Japanese consent. The Japanese EEZ extends 200 nautical miles immediately off the Japanese mainland, and Japan retains exclusive access to the exploration and exploitation of resources within the zone. Foreign vessels are able to pass through another country’s EEZ so long as they do not participate in proprietary activities reserved for the coastal state, such as fishing or conducting research. China’s intrusions, while not illegal per se, are still seen as intimidating by Japan.
Chinese survey ships have been spotted conducting unauthorized seabed topography and geological surveys within the EEZ, and armed Chinese Coast Guard vessels have made incursions into the nearby waters. Foreign vessels are able to pass through another country’s EEZ so long as they do not participate in proprietary activities reserved for the coastal state, such as fishing or conducting research, which serves as another legal avenue for Chinese intimidation.
While Chinese marine presence in the area surrounding the islands has been particularly prevalent, outward demonstrations of force or military threats have been notably rare. In fact, China recently pulled back its coast guard vessels in mid-October, concluding its record stay of 335 days. In spite of this, Japan still remains cautious of future Chinese intrusion, with the coast guard spokesman stating that “If they come again, we will respond resolutely.”
South Korea
Another key area of marine dispute lies within the South Korea-China Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ). The PMZ is the disputed zone where China and South Korea’s EEZs overlap. A 2001 deal between the countries allowed fishing to occur in the area but placed a ban on other marine activities.
However, China established three large structures along the western ridge of the PMZ, claiming them to be salmon farming and aquaculture management facilities. South Korea expressed worries that the structures may be poised to “straddle the boundary,” a move that may aim to increase Chinese territorial presence in the area.
In late February 2025, a South Korean research vessel, Onnuri, was sent to investigate one of these structures but was blocked by the Chinese coast guard. South Korea expressed concern that the structures violate their lawful maritime rights, claiming they may physically obstruct the travel of fishing and naval vessels. Although they appear focused on aquaculture, there are concerns that the platforms may be dual-purposed; the structures are likely already collecting valuable data for undersea detection and navigation.
China has also established several “no-sail” zones, prohibiting ships from entering designated areas within the PMZ. One such zone appears, according to the coordinates provided by the China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) in Lianyungang, to be located within South Korea’s EEZ. Two additional zones designed for military exercises were also established north of the first zone, with one of these also overlapping with South Korea’s EEZ. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an EEZ guarantees a state’s “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil.” While most countries interpret this clause to mean that all ships and aircraft enjoy high seas freedoms within their country’s own EEZ, China has disputed this interpretation.
The Philippines
In October 2025, China and the Philippines had a marine dispute in which a Philippine fishing vessel belonging to Manila’s fisheries bureau was shot at by a water cannon and rammed by Chinese forces. The episode occurred after two Philippine government vessels reportedly “illegally entered” waters near Sandy Cay, a coral reef located midway between Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing claimed that the Philippine government was responsible for the collision after the Manila vessels, with them having "dangerously approached" a Chinese coast guard ship.
The incident occurred in the Spratly Archipelago, located within the waters of Thitu Island, which hosts Manila’s primary military base and serves as the home to several hundred Philippine nationals. Maintaining control over the island helps ensure the Philippines hold a stake in the resources of the archipelago, including its oil and gas reserves as well as vital fishing grounds in the surrounding waters.
Philippine coast guard spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela labeled China’s actions as “bullying tactics and aggressive actions” and said that the Philippines “will not be intimidated or driven away.” The U.S. has also publicly condemned China’s actions, with U.S. Ambassador to Manila MaryKay Carlson praising the Filipino personnel involved in the incident for their “tremendous valor and skill in the face of China's dangerous ramming and use of water cannons."
China has been observed increasing its influence in the Spratly archipelago by constructing ports, military installations, and airstrips in close proximity to the archipelago. Chinese dredgers have been spotted artificially expanding or creating new islands within Mischief Reef, located within the Filipino EEZ, creating over 3,000 acres of land. Despite previous pledges not to militarize its outposts, satellite imagery shows that China has constructed additional military infrastructure, such as a 10,000-foot runway, fighter jet hangers, helipads, sophisticated radar systems, and anti-ship cruise missile systems along the reef.
From as early as the 1970s, there have been numerous historical territorial disputes over the South China Sea between China and other Southeast Asian nations. The sea and its islands are thought to hold over 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which has led to multiple territorial disputes between China and the other nations bordering the South China Sea, such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
Taiwan
Taiwan is an independently governed island formed in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War between the nationalists and communists that took place in the first half of the 20th century. The defeated Chinese nationalists retreated to Taiwan and set up their own government and have independently ruled the island since 1949. Beijing sees Taiwan, despite having never governed it directly, as a renegade province that needs to be reunified with the Chinese mainland. While China stresses that it wishes to do so peacefully, it has also emphasized that it will use force if necessary.
China has engaged in military drills with what appears to be the purpose of preparing for a potential full-scale invasion of the island. In April 2025, the Chinese military carried out live-fire strikes in the East China Sea and rehearsed blockade operations near crucial shipping lanes to the east and west of Taiwan.
China has also made significant intrusions into Taiwanese waters. On August 8, 2025, the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense spotted 38 Chinese aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait, considered the maritime border separating the island from mainland China. The National Security Bureau of Taiwan reported in late October 2025 that seven to eight commercial vessels passed through restricted waters near Kinmen, a set of Taiwanese islands located a few miles off the coast of mainland China. The Taiwanese government also claimed that there were several unidentifiable vessels whose automatic identification systems were deactivated.
Taiwan holds significance as a part of the so-called “first island chain,” a chain of islands crucial to American foreign policy, as they are geographically poised to serve as the first line of marine defense against China. China must break through the chain of islands if it wishes to expand its military presence into the greater Pacific Ocean.
The Future of Chinese Maritime Ambitions
The root of outward Chinese military aggression in a maritime setting appears to come from one large place of interest: economic resources. The conflicts with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan all stem from a desire to secure economically salient territory. While other factors certainly come into play, such as the historical significance China places upon “reunifying” Taiwan, it appears quite clear that, in the vast majority of these scenarios, economic value supersedes other concerns.
This motivation is relevant as economic wants are insatiable. If, for instance, China sought such territories believing that it was “owed” them on a historical basis, then that creates a finite end to their maritime ambition.
However, because China’s maritime ambitions stem from a desire for economic gain, it is unlikely that it will cease its pursuits if it were to obtain the territories and areas of the sea it is currently trying to assert control over. If its true motivation stems from something as impersonal as the accumulation of wealth and territory, then such pursuits do not have a finite end goal in mind. Leaving China alone and allowing it to obtain the territories it seeks will encourage it to obtain a greater chokehold not only within the East and South China Seas but also poise it to expand its military ambitions beyond its neighboring oceans.
With these motivations in mind, Chinese maritime behavior appears to exhibit a form of salami-slicing strategy. China is deliberately committing actions with the purpose of either ensuring access to abundant resources, often at the expense of other nations, or reclaiming territory it believes to be rightfully its own. Such pursuits exist outside of diplomatic negotiation, instead relying upon demonstrations of military intimidation. One may claim that China’s intrusions into its neighbors’ naval territories are too minor to be of note, but this would only be the case if China had only a few such intrusions. The issue, which points to Beijing adopting a form of salami-slicing in its approach to marine affairs, is that these aren’t just a few isolated events; they’re a pattern. If China were to use the same displays of passive intrusion in the Senkakus as in South Korea’s shared PMZ and flaunt its military strength against both the Philippines and Taiwan, then it is an apt assumption that this action is not an uncalculated coincidence; it is intentional.