Putin is not afraid of NATO

For too long the narrative of NATO expansionism as the impetus for Russia’s invasions of Ukraine has run unaddressed. Proponents argue that in 2014 and 2022 Russia was responding to the encroachment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is an argument that finds its origins in John Mearsheimer’s 2014 paper published in Foreign Affairs titled “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” However, these arguments fail to capture Putin’s state of mind, omit inconvenient facts, and ignore newer developments such as Finland’s unobstructed ascent to NATO membership.

In the 2008 Bucharest summit, NATO countries failed to reach the needed consensus to offer Ukraine and Georgia membership. Instead, they merely declared, “These countries will become members of NATO.” However, Ukraine would soon reverse its course towards Western military integration. Then president Viktor Yushchenko, who was elected in 2004, was defeated in the 2010 election by Victor Yanukovych. Unlike Yushchenko, Yanukovych stood strongly for integration with Russia, and an end to aspirations for joining the NATO alliance. Yanukovych wasted no time and passed legislation No. 2411-VI of 1 July 2010, which codified Ukraine’s neutrality. Ukraine barred itself from joining military alliances, an act that the president of Russia at the time, Dmitry Medvedev, met with praise and a visit to Kyiv in May of that year.

Furthermore, non-alignment enjoyed overwhelming support from Ukrainians. According to one poll conducted in October 2013, only 20% of Ukrainians supported accession to NATO, while two thirds were opposed and 15% were undecided. Knowing its unpopularity, even the Western opposition of the Euromaidan revolution never expressed support for joining the alliance. After 2010 and before the 2014 ousting of Yanukovych, there were no instances of Russian officials requesting guarantees that Ukraine not be allowed to join NATO, despite several meetings with NATO officials at the NATO-Russia Council. Even after Russian forces had stormed Crimea, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk rejected the idea of joining NATO. It wasn’t until August of 2014 that legislation was proposed to reverse Ukraine’s nonalignment commitment. Three years later, in 2017, Ukraine finally reestablished NATO membership as a strategic objective. 

As for the argument that Russia was afraid of the more general eastward crawl of the alliance, a look at the timeline of NATO accessions provides the best counterargument. Prior to 2014, the last time NATO had expanded eastward was in 2004 when the Baltics, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria joined. In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined, though these two are far from Russian borders. Leading up to 2014, it had been a decade since NATO expanded eastwards, and membership aspirations were decreasing. Russian irredentism rekindled desire for membership. Putin is no fool; he understood aggression would have this effect. 

Those who argue Ukrainian NATO membership was the motivation for the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas must fill in only the parts that benefit their view while ignoring these important details. The actual reasons for the invasion are beyond the scope of this article, but most academics agree the reasons lie in Putin’s desire for a sphere of privileged Russian influence, which includes Ukraine. This desire is distinct from the ostensible security concerns that some have argued underlie Putin’s motivations. Conventional wisdom argues that Putin seeks desirable but nonessential advantages, Mearsheimer argues that Putin is reacting to an imminent security breach (pg. 79 and 83). Ukraine’s move towards EU integration in 2014, combined with the ousting of Yanukovych, Putin’s yes man, led Russia to capitalize on the chaos and scoop up territory that remains contested today.

In February 2022, Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, no longer limited to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. The move shocked most everyone, including John Mearsheimer (around 28:40). Such an act was thought far-fetched, even for Putin. Until 2022, Putin seemed content with waging small-scale conflicts such as those in Georgia and the Donbas. Once again, the argument was levied that Putin was motivated by “NATO expansionism.” However, Ukraine was no closer to NATO membership in 2022 than it was in 2017. Ever since the 1995 study on enlargement, NATO has practiced a policy that prevents countries with active territorial disputes from joining the alliance. This is to prevent NATO members from inheriting conflicts. By 2022, Ukraine remained far from NATO membership, as it had been embroiled for nearly eight years in a hybrid war against Moscow-backed insurgents and the covert involvement of Russian troops. 

Putin idled when Finland and Sweden applied for and signed onto the North Atlantic Treaty in 2023 and 2024, respectively. In fact, Putin said he had no problem with Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Finland shares a roughly 1300-kilometer border with Russia; St. Petersburg, Russia’s second largest city, lies less than 200 kilometers from the Finnish border. According to Finnish intelligence, Putin redeployed about 80% of Russian forces from the Finnish border to Ukraine. Ukraine, which was no closer to NATO accession than it had been for the past 8 years, was suddenly a bigger problem than NATO expansion to Russia’s doorstep. This fact alone should lay to rest any misconception that Putin lives in fear of NATO; he is rightly confident that the alliance will never seek aggressive action against nuclear-armed Russia. NATO operates on consensus, meaning it cannot act without approval from all members. Considering the alliance could not even agree to allow Ukraine to join in 2008, could one really believe it would run headlong towards an attack on Russia unanimously?

The recent incursions by Russian drones and aircraft of NATO airspace further demonstrate Putin’s brazenness. On 9th and 10th September, 24 Russian drones breached Polish airspace. Three days later a Russian drone violated Romanian airspace. On September 19, three MiG-31’s violated Estonian airspace with transponders switched off. What initially seemed like an honest mistake quickly morphed into a Russian campaign to test the limits of NATO’s resolve. If Putin was indeed concerned with a “direct threat” from NATO, would we expect to see such brash provocation? 

Russia has opposed NATO expansion for decades, yet there is scant evidence to support the claim that Putin was worried Ukraine was near membership in 2014 and 2022. Nevertheless, this anti-NATO attitude has been misinterpreted as stemming from security concerns. Putin opposes NATO insofar as it interferes with what he sees as Russia’s sphere of influence. Ukraine is the historical heartland of Eastern Europe and the cradle of Russian culture. For this reason, it holds precedence among the many countries bordering Russia. To bring this conflict to a stop, the West must understand the Russian perspective. Some have argued that this means recognizing “Russian security interests,” but this is just as ill-conceived as believing Putin would allow Ukraine to integrate into Western institutions without a fight. Lacking this understanding, Western negotiators will struggle to find the correct approach in the important talks to come.

Global NewsJonah QuaaleComment