A Look at the Sahel Post-ECOWAS Departure
https://www.dailysabah.com/world/africa/junta-ruled-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-sign-mutual-security-pact
On January 29, 2025, celebrations broke out in Ouagadougou, Niamey, and other regions of the Sahel. The countries of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali officially withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The nations of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, as well as the greater Sahel region, have faced an alarming rise in jihadist terrorism estimated to have displaced millions. According to Alkassoum Abdourahmane, a political and security commentator on the Sahel region, as much as 40 percent of the world’s terrorism occurs in the Sahel region alone. In addition to insufficient military protection, ECOWAS lost public favor from its response to Sahelian coups, responding especially aggressively to Niger with harsh sanctions and a military threat—both actions rumored to be influenced by the French. Following the sanctions, French troops were removed from the region due to distrust.
These events, occurring on top of public distrust in ECOWAS due to Western economic affiliations, pushed Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023. Now having achieved their goal of leaving ECOWAS, the three junta governments are forming a 5,000-soldier army to combat terrorism. However, this is far from being a temporary defense alliance; an AES passport has been made, and ties with Russia are strengthening to stabilize this breakaway from ECOWAS and the West. As of now, the AES is here to stay, with intentions to become more than a confederation. While widely supported by the public, experts have differing outlooks on its effectiveness. Some hail its regional pride and public interest, while others call it short-sighted diplomacy or re-tribalism, the reversion of states to their original ethnic and cultural groups. Furthermore, the outcome of the alliance could have broader implications for sub-Saharan Africa and global policy.
Public support for an ECOWAS-severed AES is widespread, though some experts doubt the power of the junta governments. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, president of the Sahel Sahara Security Strategy Center, called the alliance “honest” yet underequipped in an interview with Al-Jazeera. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are all landlocked semi-arid countries that would face further exclusion from coastal trade without ECOWAS. In a statement issued following AES withdrawal, ECOWAS promised continued access to free trade and the acceptance of the old passports until further discussion, though it is unclear how long this leniency could last. According to Abdallah, by rejecting Western aid for less consistent Iranian, Turkish, and Russian funds, the juntas are prioritizing a Cold War mentality over the welfare of their people. Regional experts maintain that economic interests should come first over appealing to anti-West public sentiment. The announcement of forming an armed force of 5,000 members also provides insight into the limited resources of the AES. For a landmass that would become the largest country in Africa if united, only 5,000 troops are able to be equipped and mobilized against widespread terrorism. Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JMIN) and Islamic State, the Sahel’s two most prominent jihadist groups, have a combined presence estimated to be around 8,000 soldiers. Instead of Western aid, the AES hopes to involve the Wagner Group, a Russian private military with ties to the Kremlin. However, unlike aid, this assistance would come at a price. If the AES is unsuccessful and ECOWAS becomes less economically forgiving, this could place the region in debt or even harm it due to the lack of regulation behind private military companies.
Despite the rejection of the West, all three Sahelian countries have been receiving support from USAID. In the fiscal year of 2024, obligated amounts of $120,000, $330,000, and $310,000 were sent to Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, respectively. These countries by no means have a severe reliance on USAID—these values account for about 1.5 percent of their GDPs. However, this value is not insignificant, and its removal could further destabilize the region and hinder their funding of anti-terrorism. Amongst USAID cuts by the Trump administration, it is unclear whether Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger will remain on the list of awards, though prospects are unfavorable. On March 10th, Secretary of State Marco Rubio estimated that about 5,200 of about 6,000 awards have been canceled, or around 85 percent of awards. Based on current USAID expenditure, it is likely that Ukraine and Israel would receive significant portions of the remaining aid, further limiting the funds received elsewhere. USAID is by no means the backbone of the Sahel, though its absence could be harmful to anti-terrorism operations, resulting in a greater reliance on Russia.
While some African experts believe the AES juntas are acting in good faith, the Human Rights Watch has expressed concerns with the accountability of the junta governments. Despite the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger occurring in 2021, 2022, and 2023, no moves away from a militant government have taken place. The military leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso have also delayed elections. While this lack of democracy may appear severe, militant rule is common in newly formed or unstable states. A greater concern is the allegations against the juntas committing acts of violence and corruption. ECOWAS possesses a Community Court of Justice, which has issued important decisions on human rights matters within the Sahel. It is possible to bypass local court systems and appeal to ECOWAS; therefore this severance from ECOWAS strips the public of a final defense if rule becomes oppressive.
The prospective success or failure of the AES has both regional and international consequences. If the AES manages terrorism and retains public support, this could weaken the influence of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU), as well as support the case for re-tribalism. Since 1991, Africa has been divided into the RECs to rebuild the African market as a whole. If ECOWAS proves to be economically beneficial or even neutral, other countries questioning their prioritization under RECs could reconsider their membership. The AES is not the first to separate—Abdourahmane recalled the departure of Mauritania from ECOWAS in 2000 and their stable security since. Similar instances could lead to decreased continental unity and what Abdallah deems as “re-tribalism.” Alternatively, a failure of the AES would bolster the African Union and the strategy of border-defined groups for continental success. Replacing unified blocs with re-tribalism cannot be determined as harmful or beneficial at this moment, though it is certainly a stark deviation from the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which aims for interconnected economic prosperity and peace within the continent.
The effects on Eastern Africa of a possible AES failure must also be taken into account. There is currently a civil war and famine in Sudan, a burgeoning civil war in South Sudan, terrorism in Somalia, and a possible famine in Ethiopia, where a civil war also recently took place. If the AES fails to contain terrorism, the jihadist attacks could reach these countries as well as other neighboring countries and even Western Africa. There could also be a weaponry exchange between groups, increasing the severity of terrorism or domestic conflict.
The establishment of the AES, its troubles with terrorism, and the distrust of ECOWAS are highly nuanced issues that can only be truly understood from within the region. From this, it can be assumed that US diplomatic intervention is not welcome and would only worsen tensions. Instead, it would be beneficial for continued dialogue between ECOWAS countries and the Sahel. In a recent statement, ECOWAS clearly expressed an “open door” view where the AES could rejoin or simply retain some economic advantages. Additionally, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have already voiced their desire for the AES to return to ECOWAS. Recalling the parades and outpouring of public support after the ECOWAS break, it seems unlikely that the AES could rejoin ECOWAS at this moment. For a newly formed governing body, the pushback and lack of decisiveness would harm their legitimacy. However, the AES should initiate compromises with its ECOWAS neighbors for military assistance against terrorism; it is in both of their interests. Due to the risk of danger overflowing, reliance on paid Russian forces would be reduced, and the AES economy would not risk detrimental isolation. To be colonized, decolonized, terrorized, and denied anti-terrorism efforts from one’s own regional group is more than enough to incite a breakaway, as seen from these Sahelian nations. However, it is imperative that the AES address issues of economic vulnerability and find reliable sources of military support. Otherwise, the formation of the AES cannot be seen as empowering—taking a stance is not noble if the suffering of their civilians worsens.