Europe’s Far Right Resurgence
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Edited by Asmi Kansagra, Thomas Baxter, Owen Andrews, and Sarah Ahmad
“Yesterday we were the heretics; today we are the mainstream,” boasted Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at a Patriots for Europe (PfE) rally. Orbán’s statement needs to be qualified, but it reflects the far-right's growing influence in European politics.
Far-right governments currently lead Hungary and Italy and form part of governing coalitions in Austria, Finland, Sweden, Slovakia, and the Netherlands (until recently). In France, Germany, Portugal, and Belgium, far-right groups form the most significant opposition parties. Reform U.K., a right-wing populist party in Britain, has topped recent polls. All these parties share similar nationalistic agendas, advocating against immigration, Islam, green deals, and the European Union.
Many see the rise of the far-right as a response to broader trends of social and cultural unease in Europe. Some point to the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, or recent waves of Ukrainian refugees, as the source of Islamophobia and/or xenophobia. Others argue that the far-right’s rise can be traced to high inflation, economic insecurity, lowered living standards, and ultimately, the 2008 financial crisis. But the real reasons behind the far-right’s rise are more nuanced.
For one thing, support for the far right does not always stem from economic insecurity. A look at most EU countries shows that employment has reached a multi-decade peak while income inequality has been on the decline. In fact, a sizable share of far-right voters are relatively well-to-do. The Netherlands, for instance, is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but in their 2023 elections, the far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) won 37 of the 150 seats in parliament, becoming part of the governing coalition from May 2024 to June 2025.
Nor can increased immigration satisfactorily explain the rise of the far right. Ireland, which has one of the largest immigrant populations in Europe, has no major far-right party. Poland, on the other hand, has one of the smallest immigrant populations, yet nearly 40% of voters supported the far right in its latest election. And in Britain, the BBC has found that immigration is a pressing concern for voters living in areas with the most and the least immigration alike. We can see, then, that real-world immigration patterns do not always correlate with far-right anxiety over immigration.
The key factor is not a specific trend in the economy or migration patterns, but cumulative voter dissatisfaction with mainstream parties’ failure to produce credible solutions to perceived social and economic challenges. Anxieties about socioeconomic status and cultural importance, fueled by the rise of social media, mean that Europeans are becoming more sensitive to immigration and economic fluctuations. Dutch voters who put the PVV in power were tired of their previous government’s failure to address the housing crisis and promotion of green measures. In Germany, lower unemployment numbers do not mean that voters are happy to comply with policies that require spending. In 2023, a German heating law that banned gas boilers in favor of heat pumps received backlash due to its unrealistic demands, which involved huge costs in installation and renovation. The reaction to the law is symptomatic of a broader discontent surrounding climate-friendly measures that are being implemented “too much, too fast.”
Far-right parties capitalize on these anxieties and discontents, manipulating the narratives surrounding them. Parties such as Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Rassemblement National (RN) in France connect daily frictions with mainstream parties, like the heating law, to a broader story of lost control and distant decision‑makers in Brussels. It helps that far-right parties are able users of social media, appealing to voters by proposing simplistic solutions to complicated problems, and benefitting, like the PVV, from the algorithms of sympathetic media exposure.
Mainstream parties are failing to respond properly to the far-right challenge. Many still try to enforce the old cordon sanitaire, but in new and more dangerous ways. As far-right parties gain more influence, mainstream parties attempt to slow their ascent by trying to appeal to their voter base, forming coalitions with the far-right, or moving rightwards on issues like immigration. But instead of keeping voters in the center, this tactic has the opposite effect. It legitimizes the far right: by proposing right-leaning policies, mainstream parties reinforce the idea that immigration or Islamic practices are severe problems that need urgent solutions, thus pushing public opinion into the arms of the far right.
Some are hopeful that offering far-right parties a seat at the table will lead them to moderate their policies and proposals. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni seems to be a case in point. After her right-wing populist party came to power, the previously Eurosceptic, pro-Russian Meloni confirmed Italy’s long-term support for Ukraine and adherence to NATO. But there is little real proof that Meloni is moving towards the center. Her domestic policies suggest that her ‘leftward’ shift was a tactical move to neutralize criticism. In 2023, she proposed a constitutional reform that could put more power into the prime minister’s hands, and her government is extending its control over the Italian judiciary and media.
Another example is the PVV, led by its sole registered member, Geert Wilders. The party is explicitly xenophobic and Islamophobic: its platform proposes repealing the UN Refugee Convention, deporting undocumented immigrants, revoking temporary asylum permits for Syrian refugees, removing all Islamic schools and mosques, and banning the Quran. When Wilders joined the governing coalition, he indicated his willingness to tone down some radical demands. But he has never modified his platform. He has simply admitted that at the moment there are “bigger problems” than the “problem” of immigration.
Some argue that none of this is cause for immediate worry. After all, the far right seems unlikely to take over major European capitals in the near future: elections won’t take place in the UK, Germany, and France until 2029, 2029, and 2027, respectively. Far-right parties are polling around 20% to 30%, which is insufficient to govern without coalition partners. Nevertheless, as recent developments make clear, the far right should not be underestimated. Many were surprised by the results of the Netherlands’ last election, just as many remain surprised by the level of support for the AfD in Germany today, despite the fact that Germany’s domestic intelligence service has classified the party as extremist.
If the far right gains more power, the consequences will be significant. Analysts warn that increased far-right influence could make Europe less economically integrated, less welcoming to minorities, and less committed to addressing climate change. Beyond this, far-right governance threatens to erode democratic norms, weaken the rule of law, and fracture European solidarity on foreign policy—particularly regarding support for Ukraine.
Mainstream parties must therefore rethink their strategies. Rather than adopting far-right rhetoric or forming coalitions that legitimize far-right positions, they need to rebuild trust by addressing real concerns with credible, practical solutions. This means developing coherent policies on housing, immigration, and climate that balance ambition with feasibility. Only by offering a genuine alternative can mainstream parties stem the far right’s advance in Europe.