Argentina’s Democracy in Crisis: The Rise of Populism and Working Class Dissatisfaction
“Farewell to President Mauricio Macri in the Plaza de Mayo” Contributor- Connie Guanziroli
The rise of President Javier Milei in Argentina reflects a growing dissatisfaction among the working class with the perceived elitism of the political establishment. Milei’s election displays the economic crisis, political disillusionment, and social unrest that Argentina is experiencing. The support that he has built is based on the concerns of the working class with the status quo and the elitism that exists in Argentina’s current state.
This phenomenon mirrors global trends of populist movements gaining traction in democratic societies experiencing crises. With a 140 percent annual inflation rate, over 40 percent of the population living in poverty, a four-year drought, and a 44 billion-dollar debt to the International Monetary Fund, Argentina is facing decay in economic development, and the working class has expressed their frustration. Since 1943, when officer Juan Perón overtook control of the government in a coup, Peronism has dominated the country’s politics. The Peronist ideology aligns more closely with left-leaning policies, like nationalizing the central bank and expanding welfare. Although there was a period when the Peronist party was banned and the twenty-year Dirty War took place, following those events, the Peronists, now known as the Justicialist party, made their way back into the political scene as one of the few main political parties—the others being the Radical Civic Union (UCR), Republican Proposal Party (PRO), and lastly, the far-right Libertarians.
As the nation’s support for the Justicialist party has continued to grow, the working class has begun to step away from Justicialism as the status quo. This dissatisfaction with the status quo has led to the rise in popularity of Argentina’s recently elected President, Javier Milei, a right-wing libertarian and self-acclaimed, “anarcho-capitalist.” Milei’s disapproval of the elitism of the Justicialist party has captured the attention of the Argentinian working class and led to his election. This division of Argentina’s democracy serves to support Lipset’s argument that the satisfaction of the working class is crucial for the stability of a society. President Milei is an advocate for drastic change. Many individuals believe that his platform plans to eliminate Argentina’s current welfare state, including subsidies and state-funded jobs, women’s rights, and the entire “political caste” as he calls the existing political system. These extreme actions would work to decentralize the government and build the economy.
Firstly, he plans to address monetary policy by removing the central bank (the Banco Central de la República Argentina, BCRA). This would also aim to reduce government intervention in the economy and promote market-driven mechanisms. Additionally, by dropping the Argentine peso and adopting the U.S. dollar as the new national currency, the Argentine inflation would be closer to the U.S. inflation rate. He also intends to signal a shift away from reliance on government assistance programs and spending. Already in his presidency, he has removed Argentina’s Ministry of Culture, as well as the Ministry of Women, Gender, and Diversity. Other ministries have also been integrated or cut back like the Ministries of Social Development, Education, Labour, Employment, and Social Security which will form the Ministry of Human Capital. Similarly, the Ministries of Public Works, Transportation, Energy, Mining, and Communications will create a new Ministry of Infrastructure. These adjustments will lower the spending on resources that Milei feels have no contribution to the success of the economy. These bold measures are meant to jumpstart economic processes, encourage private sector innovation, and ultimately, pave the way for a more dynamic and self-sufficient economy in Argentina which would benefit the working class. The feasibility of President Milei's plan depends on various factors, including the current economic conditions in Argentina, the level of support for his policies, and the effectiveness of implementation. Achieving these goals requires careful planning, investment in infrastructure, and addressing systemic issues such as corruption and bureaucracy. Milei's measures will face opposition from interests and political obstacles. It’s important to consider the potential challenges with his policies, such as potential short-term disruptions or social impacts. Ultimately, the feasibility of Milei's bold measures will depend on how well they are executed and their ability to deliver results in revitalizing Argentina's economy.
Voters elected Milei because of their shared frustration with elites in power and their treatment of the lower and working class. As Mills discussed in his piece “The Power Elite,” the power elite perpetuates economic inequality. The power elite in this case, are individuals that hold control over major industries or information within a society. In Argentina, these disparities are reinforced by the state of the sectors like the informal economy, regional inequity, and land ownership. Economic opportunity is concentrated in regions like Buenos Aires, a big cosmopolitan capital city which causes rural regions to face underdevelopment. The communities within these regions are trapped without access to economic opportunities. A majority of those in the working class are employed in the informal sector where they struggle with employment security and legal protections. Therefore, poverty is exacerbated and the elites are able to limit opportunities for upward mobility. This dominance is also present in land ownership in the country. Corporate businesses and elite families own a large portion of Argentina’s arable property, which perpetuates rural poverty. The revolving door phenomenon is also at play within this structure because of the interconnectedness between government and corporate interests. There is a transfer of former government officials on corporate boards or vice versa of corporate executives entering into high-ranking government positions to shape policies that benefit their interests. Not only does this cycle hinder government transparency from the public, but it can also prohibit the ability of working-class citizens to enter into these positions, which prioritizes private gain over public interest.
The social class structure in Argentina takes a pyramid form which is uniform to third-world countries that have a social divide between the upper and lower classes. This divide has created revolt and revolution against the power elite over the past five years in Argentina. The support and election of Milei is the emergence of the revolt that occurred against the upper class, as a result of feeling ignored and ill-represented by the Justicialaist party because of its elitist shift. Milei ran on the premise that government elites are “criminals” and “thieves,” strengthening public support for his candidacy because of their distrust of the government. Some individuals call out the irony in Milei’s statement because of his past as a chief economist for an airport company, professor, and author, as they consider him an elite in his own capacity, and now in the government as well. However, his controversial and harsh demeanor did not dissuade the general public from electing him. This decision from the public demonstrates their discontent with the status quo.
The recent success of Milei has been compared to political trends in both Brazil and the United States. With the past elections of Jair Bolsonaro and Donald Trump in these two countries, a pattern of political dissatisfaction can be observed in the working class. When the public deems a party to be elitist, distrust heightens and it seems as though blunt and rather unpredictable individuals will be favored to revolt against the existing establishment. The division between parties can also contribute to voters feeling left to decide between two lesser evils, which pushes the support of candidates who identify as against the entire system. Moreover, the satisfaction and inclusion of the working class within countries hold significant implications for democratic societies. While political elites may cater to the interests of powerful economic groups, the working class may go unheard or overlooked. Recognizing and addressing the concerns of this majority is essential for inclusive governance and ensuring that policies reflect the needs of all citizens. Without this action, the risks of revolt or rage against the political establishment are likely to occur, as it has in Brazil, the United States, and now Argentina. These parallels with political trends in Brazil and the United States underscore broader global patterns of political dissatisfaction and the rise of populist leaders who appeal to disaffected sections of societies. The election of Trump and Bolsonaro may be explained by the same phenomenon.
The success of Milei emphasizes the importance of addressing the working class and preventing further polarization in a democracy. Argentina finds itself at a critical point where economic crisis, political disillusionment, and social unrest intersect. President Mileis' rise to power on a platform of drastic change reflects the growing dissatisfaction of the working class with the status quo and the perceived elitism of the existing political state