History Repeated: Thucydides and the Ukrainian Crisis
The once frozen conflict between Russia and Ukraine has now thawed under the rising temperature of unrest presented by international leaders. Many say the West is at fault for outcasting Russia beyond its given land while others believe Russia is to blame for its extreme aggression and expansionism. While this fervent debate continues, the broader focus should be held on the geopolitics involved in international diplomacy with reckoning the reality of great power politics. Great powers such as the United States, China, and Russia compete for influence, and smaller nations like Ukraine cannot withstand the enormous political pressures of such large entities with little power to wield themselves. The eruption of the Ukrainian crisis we see today is a result of geopolitical pressures presented by powerful nations that can be identified within the fall of Melos illustrated by Thucydides in his work, History of the Peloponnesian War.
Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War serves to illustrate the power dynamics between the states of Athens and Sparta during a 30-year period of war. This cautionary tale of the use of aggression and war as a policymaking tool offers the question: can nations circumvent catastrophic war when a rising power challenges the international order? Through charting the impacts of war by examining the character of the states involved, Thucydides’ use of the Athenian transformation serves as an example of the implications of insatiable, imperialist nations who attempt to broaden the limits of their jurisdiction—all while provoking the inevitability of war.
Furthermore, this text explores how buffer states crumble between the friction of great powers. Amid the war between Athens and Sparta, states in Greece were divided into smaller city-states and towns that were allied with either Sparta or Athens during the Peloponnesian War. With such polarization dividing ancient Greece, Athenian ambassadors ventured to Melos, an independent state during the war, demanding they abandon their neutrality and join Athens’ fight against Sparta, out of fear that they would be recruited by the opposition.
During the discussion in The Melian Dialogue, Athens presents an ultimatum to Melos in which they either accept their alliance or be murdered and enslaved by their forces. Melos stands firm in their neutrality and delivers an argument cemented in hope and justice, while Athens forces them to abandon their ideas of morality while deeming them inferior, asserting, “the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel…the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”
Melos was a small state trapped between two juggernaut powers being forced to choose a side in a conflict they wanted no part of. All they wished for was to protect the independent state they had cultivated with dignity, as they were willing to die and become enslaved before succumbing to Athenian pressure. Conversely, Athens believed their influence was boundless as there was a “law of nature to rule wherever one can,” and anyone with their strength would also remain steadfast with the deficit of constraints presented by small states.
The future perseverance of Melos was dependent upon if they joined Athens and relinquished their independence. However, they remained unwavering in their neutrality as they believed they were acting justly and would be protected by the gods and Sparta, with whom they shared a similar institutional structure. Athens ultimately invaded Melos, which led to the state’s disintegration alongside the enslavement of all Melian women and children and the death of all men.
As this phenomenon is repeated throughout modern history, it highlights the fates of these smaller actors being dependent on the strategic interests of superpowers. In the 20th century, the strongest resemblance to Melos is identified within the collapse of Belgian neutrality during World War I. Guaranteed by the allied powers of Britain and France through the Treaty of London, Belgium was absorbed into the war when Germany turned against the West to take on France as they plundered through Belgium with absolute disregard for their neutrality, deeming them inferior to their power. Belgium suffered the loss of 9,000 civilians and remained under German control for four years until an Armistice in 1918.
When considering the geopolitics of the Ukrainian crisis today, it is clear that the lessons of Thucydides ring true—Russia is to Ukraine as Athens was to Melos. Russia is a great power, and President Vladimir Putin will not allow Ukraine to become aligned with NATO and the West despite any legitimacies or moralism found within arguments made by President Volodymyr Zelensky or any Ukrainian citizens.
The history behind the recent resurgence of Ukrainian instability further demonstrates the irrepressible desire of great powers in establishing an international order. Championed by the United States, the growing expansion of a world order found within the alliance of NATO gained momentum after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. During this time, the Ukrainian parliament declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 to form a democratic government where it began to seek relations with the West and an alliance with NATO. In 2008, under the George W. Bush administration, the United States recognized Ukrainian intentions for allyship but merely promised future membership without laying out a direct path to achieving it. From this point forward, Ukraine’s intense desire to develop Western relationships only grew as Russia simultaneously grew infuriated with the spread of democracy.
Now, as Russia has initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, modern nations prove to be no exception to the power dynamics recorded within the Peloponnesian War in 5th century BC. As Athens feared the rising influence presented by Sparta, they conquered Melos in speculation that they would join the enemy, even if their objective was to remain neutral and to stand by their citizens. Parallel to the Russian motives behind the Ukrainian crisis, Putin fears that the state it once had jurisdiction over will forever be lost through future Western expansionism. Additionally, Putin has also introduced a series of demands for peace in which he claims the violence will not cease until NATO forces withdraw their aid and Ukraine halts its pursuit of joining Western alliances. Presenting this ultimatum further binds Zelensky by the chains of Russian dominance as he strives to protect the democracy enjoyed by his people at all costs, quite similar to the experiences of Melian leaders that we have discussed.
It is apparent that Melos failed to act rationally and to acknowledge their disadvantage to Athens, risking their entire nation for the sake of justice and hope. Perhaps if they made a decision based on realist viewpoints, they would have submitted to their superior and saved the lives of millions of people. However, the will of the people remains prominent in matters of national sovereignty. As seen in Ukraine, Zelensky promoted citizen participation in the war against Russia by streamlining the process of joining the army and providing weapons and training. Recognizing their power deficit while moving in unison as a nation, the Ukrainian people remain optimistic as citizen Roman Nabozhniak expressed, “Among my friends and peers, there are no arguments now between those who supported Zelenskiy and those who supported [former president Petro] Poroshenko, we have set them aside. Now we have to back this government with one voice. Unity is our most powerful weapon.” Ultimately, just as in the case of Melos, the Ukrainian people are willing to die to save their democracy rather than to be absorbed into the control of a corrupt superpower.
The current sacrifices Ukraine must make are stark: giving up a Western alliance with the EU or NATO or facing a territorial divide with Russia. Just as Sparta had no interest in truly defending Melos as they once believed, Ukraine is not held as a strategic priority for the EU or United States. President Joe Biden continues to refuse to send troops to Ukraine, and the EU continues to hide from such geopolitics. Ultimately we see that Russia is exerting force to pursue its geopolitical goals while NATO and the EU remain unwilling to do so, which is why neither has provided Ukraine with a membership to their alliances or any granted securities.
As for a solution to dissolving the tensions between Russia and Ukraine, Thucydides does not provide an outline for peace. As his writings serve as a mere warning for how nations fail amid innate self-interest, there is no straightforward way to predict the course of future events. He aimed to educate future readers on identifying similar developments in international relations and organize policy and governmental systems to deter such outcomes accordingly.
While the forces driving the Ukrainian crisis are the power-balancing dynamics between great powers, the most tangible solution for peace appears to be for Ukraine to swallow the same pride and hope carried by the Melians. The future of Ukrainian democracy will only prevail if both Russia and the West are willing to compromise their geopolitical competition and agree upon a resolution for Ukraine extraneously. As this is far from preferred and devastating to the citizens of Ukraine, I argue the conflict cannot be settled through an ideal solution. Rather, it is about choosing between a lesser evil—just like the Athenian ultimatum to Melos.