Shifting Attitudes in Taiwan and Its Political Implications
Photo by KOKUYO is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
In recent years, Taiwan has embraced an emerging national pride, one in part a result of an increasing emphasis on its distinction from mainland China. Cross-strait relations have become increasingly tense as China has repeatedly accused Taiwan of engaging in “seperatist” behavior. Beijing still claims sovereignty over the island nation and criticizes any action that is perceived as an attack against its rule. As a result, Taiwan’s pro-Beijing Kuomintang (KMT) has found itself advertising a platform that is quickly losing popularity. The party’s desire to strengthen ties between Taiwan and mainland China conflicts directly with growing negative public sentiment towards Beijing. Similarly, Hong Kong has been on the front lines against Beijing, engaging in protests and civil disobedience multiple times since its handover in 1997. In both, citizens have grown contempt for a government that is more lenient towards Beijing’s wishes. With Hong Kong acting as an example of what Beijing rule may do, Taiwan seeks an anti-unification government. As a result, the KMT has fallen increasingly out of favor, and without structural changes to the party’s platform, it will disappear. On the opposite end, for the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), there is a strong chance that it will enjoy an upward rise in popularity as the Taiwanese seek leaders that actively press against Mainland encroachment.
There is a lot of grey area as to what exactly Taiwan is. For most Taiwanese people, Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country. However, Beijing has repeatedly asserted that Taiwan is a part of China, a wayward region that is still under Beijing’s control. In fact, the Chinese government has stated that it will not hesitate to use force if Taipei decides to declare independence or assert self-determination. Beijing swears by the idea of “one China, two systems.” This idea is the basis of the KMT’s platform and is the most important distinction with the main opposition party, the DPP. Regardless of other party beliefs, this factor will remain the most consequential and will decide how the Taiwanese people vote.
After fleeing from mainland China in the wake of civil war, the ROC, led by the Nationalist Party—or the KMT—settled on the island of Taiwan in 1949. The party’s original values mirrored those of Sun Yat-sen, the party’s founder: nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihoods. However, and perhaps most importantly, the KMT asserted its intention to eventually return to the Mainland and regain control as the official government of China. It sought eventual reunification.
Decades later, KMT officials have largely abandoned any policy decisions or rhetoric relating to the party’s desire to retake the Mainland and rule as the official government of China. Both countries eventually reached the “1992 consensus” where both sides agreed that there was one China, but two different systems. Thus, the old attitudes of retaking the government have largely disappeared. The KMT remains committed to this idea of “one China, two interpretations.” In other words, the party maintains unity with the Mainland yet acknowledges the distinctions between the two. In modern politics, this philosophy has translated to KMT members seeking closer political and economic ties with Beijing, a platform that may not be as appropriate in today’s time as it was decades earlier.
On the other hand, the DPP rose on a platform that emphasizes Taiwan's distinction from the Mainland, and while avoiding officially verbalizing independence, it has repeatedly asserted itself as a nation with political independence from Beijing. Organized in 1983 (albeit unofficially), the party initially formed on the basis of self-determination, democratic freedoms, a multiparty system, and economic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). From its creation up until the mid-1990s, there was little public support.
At the turn of the millennium, the DPP’s leader—Chen Shui-bian—became Taiwan’s elected president, the first successful challenge against the KMT in the presidential seat. However, in 2008, the presidential seat was again flipped, putting KMT Ma Ying-jeou in power. Aware of growing hostility between Beijing and Taipei, Ma ran on the premise of “one China, two systems.” This approach was a compromise that would theoretically satisfy both sides of the aisle: acknowledging the differences between Taiwan and the Mainland, yet still deeming both as a part of China. KMT’s failure at the polls eight years later proved this assumption to be incorrect. In 2016, the DPP again gained ground amid souring attitudes towards Beijing.
As this sentiment change was occurring in Taiwan, nearby Hong Kong repeatedly found itself embroiled in protests in a fight against attempts to strengthen ties and identity with the Mainland, something that Taiwan could certainly relate to. Before 1997, Hong Kong had been under British control due to treaty provisions signed at the end of the First and Second Opium War. In 1898, Britain leased more of the surrounding territory with the promise to return Hong Kong to China in ninety-nine years, or 1997. Leading up to the handover, there was a growing fear that the Chinese government would infringe on the rights of those in Hong Kong despite an agreement that Beijing allow Hong Kong autonomy until 2049. After a relatively uneventful handover, this fear reemerged years later and only increased as incidents began popping up. Each of these events seemed to indicate Beijing’s desire to assert control over the region.
In 2003, in its greatest show of political dissent since the city’s handover in 1997, hundreds of thousands took to the streets to oppose a proposed anti-subversion bill that prohibited treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Chinese government. The citizens of Hong Kong expressed their discontent, afraid that the bill’s provisions would erode their freedoms and blur the line between the city and the Mainland. In its first victory over Beijing, the bill was shelved indefinitely due to lack of public support. Taiwan had little to worry about as Hong Kong succeeded in the fight. In this case, Beijing had backed down. It did not have to assume the worst: that Beijing would deny the will of Hong Kong and do the same in Taiwan.
That same success proved to be out of reach in 2014. Protests rocked Taiwan and Hong Kong and ended with vastly different outcomes. While occurring for separate reasons and six months apart, there was one glaring similarity: frustration at the government’s attempts at strengthening relations with the Mainland. For this reason, what happened to either Taiwan or Hong Kong was indicative of what may happen to the other.
The Sunflower Movement took hold in Taiwan in mid-March in protest against a pending free trade agreement with China. The agreement, put forward by the ruling KMT, came under scrutiny not only for its contents but also for its dubious legal process. Critics argued that the bill—which supported increased dependence on the Mainland—threatened not only the viability of Taiwan’s economy, but also its security. Student leaders and civic groups came out in waves in the country’s first show of civil disobedience, overtaking the Legislative Yuan and demanding the bill be withdrawn.
Twenty-four days later, the trade agreement was shelved. Besides this monumental victory, the Sunflower Movement succeeded in other ways. The movement, for example, found public support and a growing pro-democracy sentiment amongst the populace. In the aftermath of the movement, there was increased scrutiny towards KMT President Ma’s attempts at economic integration and liberalization of trade with Beijing. Political renewal spread across Taiwan as citizens founded new organizations focusing on democracy, social justice, and the distinct Taiwanese identity. It is evident that the Taiwanese sought an identity that coincided with their nation’s independence from China. Then, in 2016, those same organizations found a voice in the election of President Tsai Ing-wen and the emergence of the DPP. Ing-wen campaigned on five reforms: generational justice, improving government, legislative reform, transitional justice, and an end to divisive government. Most importantly, she sought Taiwanese independence and stronger ties with other nations. This message proved appealing to the Taiwanese, especially in the wake of the successful Sunflower Movement.
Six months after Taiwan’s victory, the Umbrella Movement enveloped Hong Kong. While Taiwan fought off economic integration with Beijing, Hong Kong was protesting against the lack of universal suffrage and the breaking of a constitutional agreement that gave them that right. Although the Basic Law of Hong Kong—the city’s mini-constitution that came into effect in 1997—promised eventual universal suffrage and the ability to elect the Chief Executive, no date was given as to when these aims would be realized. After rejecting calls for universal suffrage for the 2007 election, the standing committee of China’s legislature ensured Hong Kong that those freedoms would come to fruition in 2017. This promise proved to unfold differently than most, if not all, Hong Kongers had hoped.
On August 31st, 2014, Beijing announced that all eligible voters would be able to have a part in electing the Chief Executive, but not directly. Instead, every voter had a choice between two or three candidates that had been nominated by a 1,200 person committee that was not much different from the existing structure. The expectation was that each Hong Kong citizen would be given a direct stake in choosing who would ascend to the highest government position in the city in an election where each person had a vote. This was not the case. With discontent already brewing in the months leading up to the decision, it came as no surprise that the announcement gave way to student strikes and mass civil disobedience.
On December 3rd, 2014, the founding leaders of the movement turned themselves in and urged the students to retreat. Then, on December 15th, the last protest site was cleared out; the Umbrella Movement came to an official end without achieving universal suffrage and the ability to directly elect the Chief Executive. In contrast to the outcome in 2003, the Taiwanese had reason to grow distrust towards Beijing. Beijing had not backed down this time. Still, while it is evident that the protests did not achieve its stated goal, the emotions and urgency gained from the experience helped Hong Kong in its next battle beginning the next year. This battle proved to be the most telling of what would happen to Taiwan if Beijing had its way.
With the bitter defeat from five years prior still hanging in the air, Hong Kong was again forming a united front against encroachments by the Mainland. On June 9th, 2019, over one million protesters filled the streets after Hong Kong’s government introduced a controversial extradition bill that would allow fugitives in Hong Kong to be transferred to the Mainland. Echoing past sentiments of previous protests in both Taiwan and Hong Kong, there were worries that the “one China, two systems” principle would become void as the bill gave Beijing greater powers over the city. If enacted, Hong Kongers believed that their freedoms would be taken from them, including their freedom of speech and freedom of the media. Hong Kong did not want to become just another Chinese city, but instead retain its distinctiveness, including its autonomy and freedoms. Considering past conflicts with Beijing, Hong Kong had learned that the CCP had creative means to renege on its promises and was not to be trusted.
As protests enveloped Hong Kong, President Tsai Ing-wen emerged as an outspoken ally. Taiwan was familiar with skepticism towards the Mainland and made it clear that it would stand by Hong Kong. The “one China, two systems” policy was something that Beijing, by applying it in Hong Kong, wanted to push Taiwan to adopt. With protests rocking the city, it was evident that the system failed. President Tsai Ing-wen was able to use this as an example as to why Taiwan needed to solidify its distance from the Mainland.
Additionally, the administration went beyond offering words of support and encouragement. In May, 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen announced that her cabinet would form a committee to formulate a plan to aid Hong Kongers seeking sanctuary in Taiwan. Resources would be allocated for this purpose and would establish formal channels for fleeing Hong Kongers to live and work in Taiwan. Due to her firm stance against Beijing and her clear support for Hong Kong, Ing-wen saw her popularity sour.
As Hong Kong and Beijing engaged in a bitter battle that continued for months (and as of writing, is still going on) the concept of “one China, two systems” became more and more undesirable as its pilot on Hong Kong was clearly failing. Despite what should have been a contractual obligation to allow Hong Kong to retain its autonomy until 2049, Beijing proved that its promises were not reliable. That was a clear message to Taiwan. By extension, the KMT had a foundational contrast to what was now becoming a much more popular sentiment. The Taiwanese wanted to deny Beijing any chances to assert its control over the island nation. Beijing had broken an international agreement that decided the fate of Hong Kong, yet the KMT emphasized formal relations with this same government. If China could not be trusted, then the KMT could not be either.
As the year drew to a close and the protests became a commonality in the city, Hong Kongers raced to the ballot box in record numbers—with over seventy percent voter turnout—in the hope of throwing the pro-Beijing coalition out of the Legislative Council. In an extraordinary referendum on the current administration and its adherence to Beijing’s will, the pro-democracy camp won control of seventeen out of eighteen districts. For comparison, the pro-Beijing camp had controlled all eighteen districts before November’s election. The landslide victory made clear that a staggering majority of Hong Kongers supported the pro-democracy camp. At least, it should have been clear—Beijing decried the election results and accused the pan-democracy coalition of illegal activities to benefit its candidates during the election; foreign actors were cited as well. Beijing would not accept the will of the people.
In regards to the movement’s original goal, the uprising was a success: the extradition bill was formally withdrawn on October 23rd, 2019. However, as the movement morphed into a larger call against the Mainland, that success became much more blurry. Any further demands were denied, including the four remaining goals of the movement: a commission inquiry into alleged police brutality, the retraction of any statement that called protestors rioters, amnesty for arrested protestors, and universal suffrage for both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive. Despite the chaos bred in the city, Beijing did not budge. Across the waters, Taiwan watched as the citizens of Hong Kong fought a seemingly endless battle.
Although the Taiwanese paid close attention to the events in Hong Kong, they also had to split their focus with the nearing presidential election. Han Kuo-yu, a member of the KMT that was recently elected as the mayor of Kaohsiung, announced his bid for the presidential seat against incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen. In addition to increasing scrutiny towards Han's policies and his friendly stance towards Beijing, he faced backlash for abandoning the city that had just put him in power.
Any attempts at appeasing the public failed—Ing-wen won her reelection by a wide margin and with a record number of votes ever casted for a presidential candidate. However, even taking into account Han’s failure to project his commitment to the people, this is part of a larger trend that sees the Taiwanese condemning closer ties with China. It is no coincidence that Ing-wen's popularity shot upwards after she began expressing her support for the Hong Kong protests; Hong Kong had emerged as a sort of ally, one that was also afraid of what Beijing’s rule would do to its society and institutions. Likewise, the same reason may explain why the KMT’s popularity dropped to an all-time low in March, 2020. The Taiwanese do not want closer political ties to Beijing, so a party that champions cross-strait relations will surely be an unpopular one.
On June 6th, 2020, Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu became the first special municipality head to be recalled; he was voted out of his mayoral position with more votes than had voted him in several months earlier. The petition to remove him was based on his sudden bid for presidency, but his position towards Beijing was a factor as well, especially in the wake of the Hong Kong protests. Han was too close to Beijing.
In February of that year, Ing-wen’s approval rating soared to nearly 70 percent. This is a stark contrast to the gloom of 2018 when the DPP lost many of its seats in the legislature and there was skepticism as to whether Ing-wen would even run for reelection. A poll released in May showed that the number of Taiwanese that identify with the KMT versus the DPP is barely comparable: 9.2 percent and 40.5 percent, respectively. After Taiwan’s success in containing COVID-19, Ing-wen was able to achieve an even greater approval rating than in February: 74.5 percent. Certainly, with the administration’s handling of the virus and the success that followed, there is sure to be an uptick in national pride.
Throughout it all, Beijing has attempted to maintain the “one China, two systems” policy, but neither Taiwan nor Hong Kong have reacted in favor of it. While the issue has always been a touchy subject, attitudes have been changing at an increasing rate against the Mainland. President Tsai Ing-wen is strong in her position, and it remains to be seen how else she and her administration push back against Beijing. However, it is clear that the KMT must make substantial changes in order to win back favor of the populace. The roots of their founding do not resonate with the current generation. Taiwan wants leaders that push back against Beijing’s attempts to enforce its rule over the island, not ones that encourage it.
Especially with the controversial National Security Law established in June, Hong Kong serves as a constant reminder of what Beijing may do to Taiwan. Now, much of what they feared has come to fruition with arrests and censorship taking hold. Even considering Hong Kong’s previous scuffles with Beijing, there is a clear indication that the CCP cannot be trusted. Hong Kong was able to experience this first-hand with its denial of universal suffrage despite being promised it a decade earlier. Despite its preaching of the “one China, two systems” idea, Beijing has repeatedly stepped over boundaries that had been established by this decree. Again, Hong Kong saw this with the National Security Law and the resultant dissolving of freedoms. Taiwan can see that Beijing may approach dialogue with promises of autonomy and freedom but will find ways to complicate matters for its own benefit. There is no reason that Taiwan should not use Hong Kong as a preview for what a KMT government will allow to happen to the nation.
Previously, the threat was not demanding of attention in neither Taiwan nor Hong Kong; while the fear was there, there was no immediate need to address it. As tensions escalated and protests enveloped both, there was no way to ignore the problem any longer. Unfortunately, with the National Security Law, many fear that Hong Kong has, at least for now, lost the battle. However, Taiwan is still capable of putting its foot down and drawing the line. The two systems are far too different for them to exist under the same country, especially as one has more power over the other.
Hong Kong had fought repeatedly against Beijing, but without the support of its own government and Chief Executive, its attempts were foiled. Perhaps this is indicative of an essential ingredient in Taiwan’s fight for independence. It has something that Hong Kong did not: universal suffrage and the ability to choose its most powerful leaders. Taiwan still has a chance to distance itself, and to do that, it needs a government that is firm in its anti-unification, pro-independence stance. The DPP promises this; the KMT renounces this. As it is now, the KMT will decline further. The example set by Hong Kong ensures this. However, with the KMT’s demise, we will likely find the DPP leading a stronger, firmer, more independent Taiwan that will fight against Beijing, not alongside it.