After decades of relatively low nuclear stakes, generated by arms treaties and cooling global tensions, the threat of nuclear weapon usage has reemerged with the Russia-Ukraine war. In the fall of 2022, concerns arose that Russia was contemplating the use of tactical nuclear weaponary, leading to an “unprecedented level of contingency planning” as “senior members of the Biden administration became increasingly alarmed by the situation.” 

As Russia spread misinformation about Ukrainian use of a dirty bomb (a conventional bomb with radioactive material), concern within the Biden administration was further exacerbated when U.S. intelligence discovered that the Russian government was discussing the use of nuclear weapons. Bob Woodward's new book War reveals that the administration estimated the chances of a nuclear strike at the time at 50%.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin allegedly told Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu,“all the restraints that we have been operating under in Ukraine would be reconsidered” in response to a nuclear strike which led to the situation moderately diffusing. However, concerns about Russia’s nuclear stockpile continue to loom.

Meanwhile, Russia has suspended its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the last existing nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, which limited the amount of fully functional, deployed nuclear weapons the two nations may have at any given time. Furthermore, Russia has refused to enter negotiations, stoking fear that we’re headed for a “second Cold War,” with a restocking of the nuclear cupboard on both sides. 

For the sake of mankind, we must reverse this growing trend. In looking for ways to understand this turbulent landscape, we should look towards the relationship that the United States and USSR had during the Cold War.

Constants from the Cold War to present day

For one, NATO is still a major player when it comes to European defense. Established in 1949 in response to Soviet expansionism following World War II, NATO has grown to include 32 member countries. 

The creation of NATO seemingly antagonized the USSR, which signed the Warsaw Pact, an Eastern European military alliance, in response. Comparably, Russia viewed the addition of the Baltic states, formerly of the Soviet Bloc, in 2004 as a “threat to Russia’s national security.” 

Furthermore, discussion surrounding the potential addition of Ukraine, with the 32 NATO member countries declaring Ukraine to be on an “irreversible” path to membership over this past summer has only done more to stoke the flames. With an erratic and unpredictable leader like Putin in power, any minor move by NATO could be understood as aggression.

In addition to the creation of NATO, the issue of how to handle Germany in the early post-war years was a particularly tricky subject for the two sides. The United States and the USSR had distinct visions as to the way it was to be partitioned and rebuilt. In many ways, we see distinct parallels with the current land conflict over Ukraine. 

Russia views Ukraine as important for three reasons. First, because Vladimir Putin believes that a future NATO including Ukraine would further weaken his footing in Europe, similarly to the aforementioned concerns involving the Baltic states. Second, because Russia is concerned about Ukrainian nationalism and military ability. Putin himself has argued that Russians and Ukranians are “one people.” And third, for obvious territorial gains including Crimea and the Donbas region.

All three of these motivating factors distinctly parallel Soviet motivations during the Cold War. Clearly, all three factors remain motivators for Russia today.

Are there any differences today?

Arguably the biggest difference that exists in the nuclear sense today is a genuine concern over nuclear proliferation with regards to a minor power or even a non-state actor. Experts have concluded that nuclear weapons would be out of reach for terrorist organizations. But what if these groups had the backing of a global nuclear power? “The most likely source from which terrorists might acquire nuclear material or a complete warhead is Russia,” say arms control experts. This worry didn’t exist while the nuclear playing field was still being shaped during the Cold War. Nuclear-capable rogue actors would lead to acts of terrorism never before imaginable. A nuclear-capable rogue actor would exist outside normal chains of communication, with less to lose. The possibility is terrifying.

The addition of another nuclear superpower in China, which the Department of Defense says will have more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, and the introduction of other minor nuclear powers are also critical differences that play a part in a shifting nuclear playing field. Russia and the United States are no longer in sole control of the global geo-political landscape.

Furthermore, the instability in the Middle East represents another threat, with recent conflicts seeming to indicate a lack of American sway. How can we expect to control Russia when we may not even be able to control our allies?

Why did the Cold War remain “cold”?

Ultimately, the good news is that we clearly have a comparison that didn’t end in nuclear armageddon. Although we came close during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the coexistence of two superpowers, neither of which ever felt a true existential threat, meant that relative peace won out. But the critical question nowadays is whether or not one leader, Putin, considers that existential threat to remain. 

Thus far, he has been kept in check one way or another. But will western “provocations” add up? Will Ukrainian resistance prove to be too much? Or will a bad day simply get to him? Could Putin decide that going out while taking the rest of the world with him is the right idea? 

For the time being, the answer is seemingly no. Nobody really wants a nuclear war. Nobody wanted one during the Cold War. As much posturing as we may see, mutually assured destruction remains the key rule of the game. That much has remained constant since the early 1960s, when Russia’s stockpile reached second-strike capability. So in theory, with theory carrying a lot of weight, nothing has really changed since the conclusion of the Cold War. 

Maybe that means it will be possible for a nuclear cooling, similar to that of the Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Reagan era. The world certainly would be a safer place.