September 3, after less than a year in office, Suga Yoshihide stepped down from his post as Japan’s Prime Minister by officially stating that he would not seek re-election. His predecessor, Abe Shinzō, served eight consecutive years in the post, a record unheard of in the history of the position. Suga’s early exit and the similarities between him and his successor could mean the revolving door of the Japanese prime ministership has begun to spin again.

The Liberal Democratic Party’s perennial majority in the Diet, the Japanese legislature, allows it to select the new prime minister internally with each change of leadership, leading to internal power struggles between the old guard and up-and-coming reformists within the party. Suga’s departure was no exception, as a broad spectrum of candidates threw their hats into the ring. Among the favorites were Takaichi Sanae, a darling of the LDP’s conservative wing; Kishida Fumio, Abe’s former foreign minister and a top candidate from Suga’s election; and Kono Taro, a charismatic young leader educated in the United States with bold ideas for change. After a highly contested election that went to a runoff between Kishida and Kono, Kishida emerged as the winner. This signaled the party leadership’s reluctance to allow younger reformists to take the lead and its confidence in its hold over power without popular support in favor of Kishida.

Kishida is a face for the old party leadership to place their priorities behind. Much like Suga in 2020, party leadership views Kishida as a safe bet and is expected to remain within the mainstream party platform. Kishida’s political career began in the office of Hiroshima’s seat in Japan’s House of Representatives, a position held previously by both his grandfather and father. Kishida first won the seat in 1993 and remains there today. Kishida experienced a steady rise through party ranks and served during Abe’s term as foreign minister. Kishida is widely described as an uncontroversial moderate, with a political record free of major failure. He is little more than a puppet for old LDP benefactors.

Kishida offered his first major policy speech on October 8 following his official election as prime minister, promising “new capitalism” and wealth redistribution to address a stagnant economy and a disgruntled middle class. His policy agenda has proven uninspiring for the Japanese public, who have expressed desire for action to address Japan’s aging population and see Kishida’s economic plans as a continuation of the unsuccessful ‘Abenomics’ from the previous administrations. The three arrows of Abenomics—large-scale monetary easing, fiscal spending and structural reforms—were aimed at revitalizing the world’s third-largest economy after years of stagnant growth, but most of the policy’s benefits went to corporate political interests. "We can't achieve strong growth if wealth is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people," stated Kishida in a press conference. His success hinges on his unrealistic and unexplained “income-doubling plan” as well as the tradeoffs between redistribution and corporate growth, which could weaken his support within the party. If he succeeds, finding a balance between economic growth and wealth redistribution will win him strong support throughout all levels of the party and prove his departure from the failures of previous administrations—but failure will be costly. 

The position of prime minister in Japan is notoriously unforgiving. The LDP has held a near monopoly on power since WWII, guaranteeing some degree of control over the prime minister’s actions while in office. Maverick thinkers within the party are typically quashed before they have a chance to achieve real power, making the ascension of reformists like Taro Kono a true rarity. The LDP is often able to pursue its agenda without feeling voter pressure, which could be a large contributor to the economic stagnation of the past decade. Kishida’s record paints him as the status quo pick, a reality that became more obvious with his dissolution of parliament for an October 31 general election. The LDP is rightfully confident that it can retain its majority and continue its agenda without popular support due to the disorganization and weakness of its opposition. The nearest opposition, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), only holds 154 of 710 seats in the Diet as opposed to the LDP’s 386.

As the effects of the global pandemic recede and voter turnout and civic engagement return to higher levels, Kishida’s job will likely be on the line if public opposition can be organized. Despite a similar record to the former Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, Kishida is painted as a ‘fresh face’ by the LDP. His “income-doubling plan” has already drawn major scrutiny for being little more than a rebranding of the failed “Abenomics” strategy used by his predecessors. If he remains unpopular over his first year in office, it is likely that he will suffer the same fate as Suga and many others before him in taking an early exit from Japan’s top post. Historically, charismatic prime ministers, such as Abe Shinzo and Koizumi Junichiro, experience the greatest long-term stability in the top role by consolidating power in their cabinet while simultaneously leading with a bravado that is appealing to the public. Kishida has struggled to connect with voters, and he has difficulty generating enthusiasm even from members within his party. The best choice to replace Kishida in the near future is the recent election’s runner-up, Kono Taro. Kono is wildly popular among the Japanese public and in the international arena due to his avid Twitter following, exceptional English skills, and relevant experience as foreign minister, defense minister, and, most recently, Suga’s minister in charge of the vaccine rollout. Elevating Kono to prime minister would signal a change in the LDP and bring on fresh confidence from the public to retain the party’s grip on power for years to come. 

The LDP’s reluctance to allow rank-and-file members of parliament to ascend to the upper echelons of leadership will be a gamble coming out of the pandemic. As Japan recovers and COVID-19 moves away from the front of political discussion, voters will return to issues such as the aging population and unhealthy working culture that were upsetting them before. Come fall 2022, the Japanese people’s voice may ring louder if Kishida’s plan for economic growth is unsuccessful. The LDP and Kishida must learn to adjust with the times if they are to retain their vice-grip on power in the Japanese government or the revolving door of the Japanese prime ministership will continue to spin again.