“I got a sense of his soul,” remarked a smiling George Bush after first meeting young Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2001. It was the first of a series of hopeful remarks about Putin from prominent Western officials, who believed he could usher in a new age of Russian relations with the West. Now at 70, the question of Putin’s soul is no laughing matter. While he remains well positioned to run Russia, struggles in the invasion of Ukraine have mounted and Wagner leader Dmitry Prigozhin’s audacious mutiny have shaken the foundations of his power. Though he is unlikely to be removed from power soon, these developments will certainly embolden potential heirs. The most plausible successors to Putin are heavily interlinked with intelligence agencies, prominent oligarchs and the current status quo in the Kremlin. They share Putin's bellicose view of the West and few, if any, would mean better relations with the West were they to rise to power. 

Dmitry Medvedev, the fire-breathing former president, is one such worst case scenario. Regularly raging against the West on social media and threatening the use of nuclear weapons, Medvedev has risen to his position in Russia through ultimate loyalty to Putin. He served as president of Russia from 2008 to 2012, in order to help Putin skirt constitutional limits during his time in the Kremlin. His rise to power also brought hopes in the West of a new era of relations with Russia, which the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia proved monumentally overly optimistic. Despite most recently reporting an annual income of roughly $70,000, Medvedev owns many luxury villas, apartments, and sports cars. Hopelessly corrupt and fervently anti-Western, Medvedev has no designs on reforming the Russian political system. Putin values loyalty above all else, and Medevedv’s decision to cede the presidency back in 2012 cemented his status in Putin’s inner circle. However, his status amongst other Kremlin elites is less certain. His best chance at running Russia again comes in the event that Putin willingly cedes power and enters retirement. 

Loyalty has given rise to the careers of other potential usurpers. Putin’s longtime bodyguard Aleksey Dyumin saw repeated promotions after his service and rose to the position of deputy Minister of Defence. A product of the inner workings of the Russian elite, there is little ambiguity about Dyumin’s foreign policy outlook: Dyumin commanded the special forces units responsible for the 2014 annexation of Crimea. In 2016, he was made the Governor of Tula Oblast, a region of 1.5 million people south of Moscow. In 2021, slated to return to the halls of power in the Kremlin as Minister for Trade or head of the FSB, Dyumin was outmaneuvered by competing interests within the FSB and forced to serve another term as governor. Dyumin now finds himself at a considerable disadvantage in attaining top positions, as Kremlin power structures consistently favor deputy ministers over outside governors. 

Rising from a similarly unconventional background, former tax service head and current Prime Minister Mikhail Mishutin has seen his star rise precipitously under Putin. In stark contrast to counterparts like Medvedev, Mishustin has remained tight-lipped about the invasion of Ukraine. Though highly corrupt like his Kremlin colleagues, he has refrained from consistent attacks on the West, focusing instead on economic issues. Mishustin’s muted stance on Ukraine means he represents one of the few successors whose ascension to power does not guarantee continued dismal relations with the West. Despite this, he has still managed to stay remarkably close to Putin, while others like Dyumin have seen their stars rise and fall. His best claim to the seat of power is Article 92 of the Russian constitution, which states that if the president were to be unable to carry out his duties, Mishustin, the Prime Minister, would lead the country. However, as a former tax chief, Mishustin lacks connections with Russia’s intelligence services or other sources of hard power. He stands a chance to lead Russia if Putin cedes power, or if Russian elites decide they want a reset with the West. 

Yet the man most well positioned to run is a relative unknown amongst the heavyweights of the Kremlin. Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev is the son of former FSB head and current Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. The elder Patrshuev is enormously influential within the Kremlin, remaining loyal to Putin while wielding power independent of him. While his 72-year-old father is likely too old to lead Russia, at 45, Dmitry Patrushev is considerably younger than his counterparts. Though his position as Minister of Agriculture may give the appearance of a man far from the halls of hard power in the Kremlin, official titles mean very little in Russia. Instead, power stems from connection to the three letter intelligence agencies (GRU, SVR, FSB), financial resources, as well as clan affiliations and patronage systems. Patrushev, thanks to his father and brother Andrei—who has deep connections with the energy industry— has all of these. While his public statements on internal and external politics are limited, as a product of the Kremlin system and son of a ruthless and Western-hating father, policymakers from D.C. to Warsaw ought not to hold their breath on better relations. 

In traditional autocracies, top military officials like Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov might present plausible, even likely options for succession. Yet neither men present any threat to Putin, or stand a chance of rising to power in his absence. First, Defence Minister Shoigu’s Tuvan heritage precludes him from leading Russia. Amongst the Russian elite, anything other than ethnic Russian heritage is a disqualifier. He is also, like Chief of Staff Gerasimov, highly unpopular with military commentators and the general population. Shoigu and Gerasimov serve as punching bags on Putin’s behalf to allow news pundits and military commentators to acknowledge setbacks in the invasion and criticize top leadership without questioning Putin. The pair are also unpopular within the Kremlin and many within military leadership were willing to back their removal had Prigozhin’s mutiny progressed further. With little backing from the military, elite networks, or the general public, Shoigu and Gerasimov have little hope of leading Russia. Ironically, it was Prigozhin’s mutiny which solidified their positions as Minister of Defence and Chief of General Staff. Prigozhin had fervently demanded their removal, and Putin now cannot relieve them in the near future without it appearing as a concession to Prigozhin. 

Dmitry Prigozhin’s own political ambitions were put on display during his two day crusade against Russian military leadership. Prigozhin has attempted to build a constituency in Russia to the right of Putin, arguing that he can prosecute the war far better. Like many in the Russian military community, he is committed to an aggressive Russian foreign policy, irrespective of collateral damage. His Wagner forces in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, and Sudan have repeatedly been party to mass killings of civilians. As he has been largely separated from Wagner forces as part of his deal with Putin, Prigozhin’s threat to Putin has likely faded. He has also made enemies of the influential FSB, who were opposed to the creation of Wagner Group. Were he to return to prominence or succeed Putin in ruling Russia, Russia would likely continue their campaign to destabilize Africa, and Russo-Western relations would almost certainly worsen. 

Even Western-backed reformers like imprisoned regime critic Alexei Navalny, who was recently sentenced to another 19 years in a brutal penal colony, would not guarantee better relations. While he certainly has a less bellicose view of the West than Putin acolytes, Navalny has a long history of Russian nationalism. He supported Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and claimed Crimea would remain part of Russia if he were president. Recently, Navalny has made efforts to rectify his nationalist stances. He apologized for derogatory comments directed at Georgians, and in February 2023 released a 15 point plan for a Navalnist Russia, which included recognizing Ukraine’s 1991 borders. Although he appears to have turned a corner on strident nationalism, what Navalny would do when free from Western backing is unclear. Regardless, Navalny would need a popular revolution to put himself in power, as he lacks connections within traditional power brokers like the intelligence agencies or prominent oligarchs. As the Russian people are consistently apathetic towards politics and a large majority still support Putin, Navalny’s chances of leading Russia are close to zero. 

Vladimir Putin’s hold on power in Russia remains considerable. While he will inevitably lose power in the Kremlin whether by choice or by force, his violently anti-Western outlook and policies will remain. The men waiting to rule Russia are power hungry and brutal, enriching themselves at the expense of Russia and the world. Products of a broken system, they will do little to change it. To deal with the next ruler of Russia, the US must utilize firm diplomacy, projections of strength and solid alliances, and not rely on hopes and positive press conferences.