Weeks after the dust settled on one of the most tumultuous presidential campaigns in American history, the Democratic Party faces an unnerving political reality: Donald Trump is back in the White House with a slim Republican trifecta. Democrats are asking themselves the same question: How can someone with a blatant disregard for the Constitution and democratic norms, who just four years ago incited an insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, storm back defiantly and win a second term? 

The facts of the race are clear: Kamala Harris and Democrats drastically underperformed in this election. The morning of Election Day, Nate Silver gave Harris a 50.015% chance of becoming the first female president, among other noteworthy firsts. FiveThirtyEight showed Harris with slight leads in at least Michigan and Wisconsin. And yet, by midnight on election night, it was increasingly clear that, on Inauguration Day, Donald Trump would find himself back in the Capitol that his supporters desecrated on January 6, 2021. 

Trump made gains in essentially every voting bloc. He ate into the former Democratic base of minority groups and working-class Americans, yielding a diverse coalition. Between 2016 and 2024, Trump has gained 27 points among Hispanic voters, 18 points among Black voters, 26 points among voters aged 18-29, and 13 points among voters with a high school education or less. 

What went wrong for Harris and the Democrats? The list is long and ever-prevalent in post-election coverage, but this article touches on a few apparent mistakes made by Democrats leading up to Election Day. The first mistake was that Joe Biden chose to run again, and even when he did drop out, Harris could not separate herself from an unpopular administration. Biden’s net approval rating on Election Eve was 38.5%, its lowest point since the height of inflation in July 2022. 

Democrats refused to heed the wise words of former Bill Clinton advisor James Carville: it’s the economy, stupid. Despite a resilient economy headed into Election Day (and, yes, basically every economic indicator shows a strong economy), voters perceived a different reality. 39% of voters viewed the economy as the primary issue on their minds at the ballot. They felt a crunch at the cash register, and the Harris team didn’t adequately address their concerns. 

The problem here is not Democratic policies but Democratic messaging. First and foremost, Democrats need to change their tone around Donald Trump. Calling Trump “dangerous” and a “threat to democracy” may be accurate, but if a voter feels their dollar will go farther under a Trump administration, Democrats cannot blame them for their pick. Further, Democrats cannot demonize or denounce as stupid the voters who supported the now president-elect. While Trump’s brashly populist economic policies sound foolish to many, including most economists, his messaging tickles an itch American workers feel. Trump, the assertive billionaire, has become the champion of the working class, even though his policies support the wealthiest Americans. 

Democrats need to listen to what voters are telling them and take a stance. Throughout this campaign cycle, the War in Gaza has been a hot-button issue for both Jewish and Muslim voters. Instead of striking a clear message of support for the Palestinian or Israeli cause, Harris waffled about a ceasefire with few actionable positions. Meanwhile, Trump told the voters what they wanted to hear: the war will be over as soon as he’s in office. The results from America’s largest Arab-majority town show the effects of this: in a city where Biden beat Trump at almost a 3-to-1 margin, Trump beat Harris by 6 points, with Green Party candidate Jill Stein taking over 18% of the vote. 

Where does the Democratic Party go from here? The party needs to take a look both inward and at the people it purports to represent. That starts by reconnecting with voters at all levels, running a 50-state strategy that connects with former Democratic strongholds. The DNC needs to invest in state and local parties to build trust in communities. The party increasingly represents the rich while losing out on low-income and historically marginalized communities, even though their policies represent these groups better. To win, they need to return to their identity as the party of the working class, minority groups, and the “average Joe”. This involves toning down the rhetoric on some hot-button social issues while focusing on the economy. There’s a line to walk on these issues; Democrats can be pro-immigration while keeping an ear to the political winds and the reality of the situation.

They need to counter Trump’s rhetoric with some populism of their own. Democratic policies, on paper, tend to be more popular than Republican policies; the problem stems from messaging, or, moreover, that Democrats cannot counter Trump’s messaging. They need to be a loud minority during the Trump administration, highlighting the (seemingly inevitable) mistakes of Trump’s second term while promoting their own policies. It’s time for Democrats to reconnect with voters after shifting towards the elite over the past decade. Democrats will have a ripe opportunity to take back the House and Senate in 2026 and the White House in 2028, but the work to do so needs to happen now.