In our globalized world, bilateral wars are never true two-player conflicts. Russian and Ukrainian troops may clash on the battlefield, but conflict localization ends there. Yet, while the economics of support for Ukraine remain diverse and multiplicable, the economics of attack have honed in on a singular Russian enemy–an enemy that, upon reflection, might have never stood alone. Even so, while Russia appeared to stand alone, the solidarity of support for Ukraine has shined.

The EU has thrown its support at Ukraine, accumulating 167 billion dollars of financial, military, and humanitarian aid as of the February 2024 commitments. Although quantities occupy the most headline space, fourteen Eastern European and Scandinavian countries have surpassed US support in percent GDP contributions. This coalition of economic and military support is crowned—in terms of quantities—with Congress’ five bills worth 175 billion dollars in aid. While most U.S. funding is diverted back to “U.S. government activities associated with the war,” the forces of Ukraine are suffused with combined international support. Yellow and blue are not the only colors on the Ukrainian side of the battlefield, but does Russian red truly stand alone? 

As Anne Applebaum’s new book illuminates, a new coalition exists on the side of the Russias: Autocracy Inc.  However, this is hardly the entrenched coalitions of the Cold War era, with rigid ideologies and limited players. This incorporation is far from a military or political alliance. It’s a bloc of uniquely autocratic but diverse companies not chained by ideology, but a “ruthless, single-minded determination to preserve their personal wealth and power.” They exchange arms, police, training, and even propagandistic troll farms and media networks. It’s a solidarity built on undermining enemies—any enemy—that opposes the stability of their autocracies and the bulk of their pockets. In the last decade, dictators have dealt with dictators, and those deals have a few words to say about the economic sanctions on Russia. 

With Ukraine’s numerous allies, February 2022 unleashed a barrage of fire in the “most coordinated and deepest economic sanctions in modern history” on Russia. The United States severed connections with its largest banks, Sberbank and VTB Bank, and all their lesser subsidiaries. They froze five billion of their banks’ U.S. assets and crumbled the ruble. Any energy, military manufacturing, and transport companies that could be targeted were attacked with debt and equity restrictions. With G7 support, a coalition of 37 countries united to economically isolate Russia from the bulk of Western trade to starve their offense and elites of 300 billion dollars. Sanctions wanted to starve the bear, but as the Ukraine War reaches the stages of mature conflict, their effects seem bulimic. 

By the end of 2022, the Russian economy was starved by economic sanctions. The anti-Russia coalition succeeded in immobilizing 300 billion dollars from Russia’s largest bank alone. Russian oligarchs surrendered billions in personal property assets internationally. Restrictions on liquidity and imports reduced Russia’s ability to mitigate semiconductors shortages, components essential to aviation and missile production. While the Ruble’s initial crash was extremely dramatic, the currency still sat comfortably below its 2021 exchange rates. However, like the ruble’s crash, economic weight loss was short-lived.

Autocracy Inc. brought fresh platters of economic opportunity with deals tailored to undermine sanctions. As Applebaum writes, Iran eagerly exported lethal drones to Russia; North Korea served missiles and ammunition. Support was delivered from as far as Eastern Africa, with Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Mali, and the Central African Republic. These delicacies of war complimented the courses served by Belarus when they allowed Russian troops to use its territory, roads, railway lines, and military bases. When others lacked military support, they made up in manufacturing: Turkey, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, all imported electronic goods. Even India added to the meal by buying cheap Russian oil, following the trend set by China’s quiet helping of arms and energy sales. The economic sanctions on Russia shed some pounds, but Russia was quickly binging on autocratic foreign support. Just as Russia faced the combined support of NATO and the EU, Ukraine, and its allies “slowly learned that they were not merely fighting Russia in Ukraine. They were fighting Autocracy, Inc.”  

Economic sanctions failed to isolate Russia enough from the global market to cause long-term damage. Despite lost assets, Russia’s Ruble and the military-industrial complex have almost completely recovered. The initial attack with economic sanctions limited the speed and impact of the initial Russian offense; sanctions on Russia alone bought Ukraine time but did not buy them a future. Nevertheless, that does not mean all cause is lost.

Autocracy Inc. overcame sanctions meant for the Russian economy alone, not economic sanctions meant for Russia and its allies. The United States had the foresight to sever immediate Russian supporters like Belarus, but the extent of Autocracy Inc.’s network did not reveal itself until the Russian recovery after 2023. While the US and the G7 continue and expand efforts to isolate markets like Russia’s four billion dollar diamond exchange, the extent of Autocracy Inc.’s support calls for broader sanctions; there’s little point in damming the flood of Russian support if you only block one-half of the river. The tune of economic sanctions must take a stronger hand at expanding sanctions to Autocracy Inc. if they are to deter the Russian support network. 2024 sanctions that target specific companies in China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates that have helped Russian companies evade the sanction's economic cost should be encouraged. As Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyem states, international “firms must ultimately choose to do business with Russia or with the United States and its partners” when it comes to hindering Russian support. 

The effect is a global conflict with no actual international boots on the ground; an economic war over a global market that cannot be fully controlled. However, conflicts are rarely won by a single endeavor. There is a risk of polarizing the world’s economy and defining sides; even so, the viability of economic sanctions depends on broader sanctions that sever these new economic alliances and confront Autocracy Inc.