Due to fundamental misunderstandings of the war in Ukraine and the economies involved, Western media and analysts have consistently predicted disaster to come for Ukraine and the West this winter. “Europe's Coming Winter Peril” was the headline the Economist ran for its July 16th, 2022 issue, predicting a devastating energy crisis in Europe and collapse of Western support for Ukraine. In late August, CNN warned of a harsh winter that would split apart the West and potentially doom Ukraine. They joined a sea of other publications anticipating a damaging winter to come for Ukraine and its Western backers. However, these gloomy predictions of the future for Ukraine and the West are cemented in faulty analyses of the realities of the EU, Ukrainian and Russian economies, and changing international support for Ukraine and Russia. The reality is that devastating effects of the winter for Ukraine are overstated, and the effects for Russia are understated. 

A central driving force behind concerns about the coming winter center around European energy availability and costs. After Russia's gradual shutdown of the Nord Stream 1 Pipeline and the onset of EU energy sanctions, European nations which were once heavily reliant on Russian energy have had to contend with its sudden absence. Surprising many, Europe effectively addressed the potential crisis through cooperation and decisive action. European leaders in early summer set a goal to fill gas reserves to 80% by the end of fall. Europe succeeded fantastically, and by October 1st had filled reserves to 86%, a number which will continue to rise before the beginning of winter. European nations currently pay an average of €300-€500 per megawatt-hour, a number that Goldman Sachs expects to fall in 2023 to “100 euros per megawatt-hour in the first quarter.” This data suggests that the European energy crisis is largely exaggerated. A heavy winter could exact a considerable economic toll on Europe, but not a devastating one. Moreover, the EU appears adequately prepared for a standard European winter. 

Yet even if Europe were to fall into significant economic turmoil, it’s unclear if that would lead to a loss of support for Ukraine, or be consequential for Ukrainian ability to continue fighting. The most frequently cited weakest link in Western European support for Ukraine is Italy, especially due to the late September election of hard-right Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.  Meloni’s coalition includes Forza Italia, a party led by former Prime Minister and avowed Putin admirer Silvio Berlusconi. Yet Meloni’s own feelings on Russia appear to be much much less sympathetic, and she has pledged to support Ukraine. Additionally, given Italy’s meager contributions to the Ukrainian war effort thus far, a drop in Italian support would have little effect on the war in Ukraine. 

A similar conclusion can be drawn for Germany, a powerful European economic force but a lagging contributor to Ukraine. Other nations, especially Poland and the Baltic states, see the war in Ukraine as an existential crisis and will continue supporting Ukraine. Although the United Kingdom is undergoing considerable leadership turmoil, support for Ukraine remains incredibly popular and aid will continue no matter who is in charge. Ukraine's most important backer is the United States, whose support will not waver as long as Joe Biden is in office. As long as American aid continues—and even potentially without it—Ukraine can keep fighting effectively. 

The economies of the EU are not the only concern; many analysts worry that Ukraine’s economy is another serious risk heading into the winter. Ukraine’s overall economy will have contracted 35% before the close of 2022. This is a serious loss of GDP, but when considering roughly one-fifth of Ukraine is under occupation, the contraction is less bleak. 

Furthermore, economic collapse for warring nations is most consequential when it destroys industrial capacity, meaning the loss of GDP is less significant for Ukraine, who gets its industrial capacity from the West. Due to this, Ukraine is better insulated from the effects of economic collapse than virtually any wartime economy of the modern era. 

Another concern for Ukraine is the inflation of its currency, the hryvnia, which hit 24% in September. Under normal circumstances, this figure would be devastatingly high, yet the context of Ukraine’s situation changes that calculus. Nearly all wartime economies experience sky-high inflation, and Ukraine’s is relatively low. Its inflation is roughly equal to that of the World War 1 American and British economies, who were not invaded and did not suffer anywhere near the devastation Ukraine is currently experiencing. When compared to the American Confederacy, who experienced a more comparable battlefield situation, it is in a significantly better position. 

Although Ukraine’s economic and international support picture is much more resilient than commonly believed, the same cannot be said for Russia. Although not immediately obvious, Western sanctions and export controls are exacting a significant toll on Russian ability to fight effectively in Ukraine. Export controls have decimated Russian ability to procure computer chips for advanced weapon systems, leading to mass shortages in precision guided missiles. 

Export controls and economic slowdown have also severely degraded Russian tank production. Construction of lethal next generation T-14 Armata and T-90 tanks have all but ceased. Russia has even been unable to replace losses for its T-72 model, a late Soviet-era tank which it employs frequently in Ukraine. Instead, the Russian military has had to turn to stocks of T-62 tanks, which was first introduced in the 1960s6. This puts Russia at near-parity with the Ukrainian tank fleet, who also operate old Soviet models like the T-64. 

The economic concerns for Russia do not stop with battlefield capabilities. According to a Yale University study led by Professor Jeffrey Sonnenfield, the Russian economy is much worse than commonly believed, and rapidly declining. Russia enjoys widespread shortages on commonly imported goods and the loss of its strong position as a commodities exporter. Russian domestic financial markets are the worst performing domestic markets of 2022 despite significant Kremlin intervention. 

The true impact of sanctions will be increasingly felt by Russia as more time elapses, and its economy will continue its path to a devastating collapse. This will most likely occur after the coming winter, but the persistent movement towards collapse will weigh heavily on Russian morale. 

Morale will also be impacted by the growing isolation of Russia in the international arena. At the outbreak of the invasion, Russia enjoyed tacit support from many non-Western nations, who trumpeted anti-Nato talking points and voted down pro-Ukrainian UN resolutions. As the war has dragged on, Russia has seen its tacit support slip. China has privately expressed concern about the war and in discussions with EU diplomats they no longer blame the war on NATO. Of course, talk is cheap, but China has continued to resist sending weapons to Russia even as its struggles mount on the battlefield. 

As Russian losses have mounted, atrocities come to light and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric has increased, other neutral nations have begun to show discontent. India has put out more pro-Western statements, including Prime Minister Nehrenda Modi’s public comment to President Putin that “today’s era is not an age of war.” India has also increasingly looked to move away from purchasing military hardware from Russia and move towards purchasing from the United States. Both China and India continue to take advantage of cheap Russian energy exports, but weariness towards the war is evident, and growing. 

An early October UN Security Council motion decrying the Russian annexation of Eastern Ukrainian territories received just a single no vote, Russia. Even North Korea, long considered the most politically isolated nation on earth, published a statement denying weapons sales to Russia. Iran, who has supplied many of its Mohajer-6 and Shahed armed drones to Russia, faces a potentially destabilizing domestic crisis of its own. If anti-regime protests continue to pick up steam, even Iran's support could come into jeopardy.

The degradation of Russia’s domestic military production capacity and worsening battlefield outcomes have meant that even the recently announced mobilization cannot change Russian military fortunes. Newly mobilized Russian troops are receiving 1-2 weeks of training before being sent to the front. Needless to say, this is not nearly enough to prepare soldiers for the frontlines, even if they are former servicemen. The downsides of this hasty mobilization are evident: newly mobilized troops have already been captured by Ukrainian forces. 

Even if Russia intended to give its troops ample time to mobilize, it's unclear if it would make any difference. Early on in the war, the Russian military sent its officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in charge of training to fight on the frontline. Now, nearly all are still fighting in Ukraine, dead or captured. In a rush to prevent mobilization, Russia doomed its success. 

Historically, winters have rarely been good for invading armies. The once invincible armies of Napoleonic France and Nazi Germany met the beginning of their respective downfalls in brutal Russian winters. The USSR itself saw defeat against a much smaller Finnish force during the Winter War of 1939. If Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires, winter is the season of burial. Many in the West have begun to realize the potency of a winter for a military force, subconsciously associating its onset with impending defeat. Yet who is whom in the Russo-Ukraine war seems to be lost. As the cold approaches, it's important that the West recognize which nation is the empire headed for disaster, and which is the defender who stands to benefit from it. The challenges which the West faces are more manageable than believed. Europe will survive a non-apocalyptic winter and the potential for loss of aid to Ukraine is inconsequential. Ukraine’s wartime economy is in better straits than many of its better prepared historical counterparts. 

The Russian economy is much worse than commonly assessed and will only continue to get worse. Where Ukraine sees an economic light at the end of the tunnel in victory, Russia sees continual descent into financial darkness. Mobilization will do little for battlefield performance and its international backing is weakening. When the snow begins to fall this winter, the West must not give in to defeatism and instead realize the true potential for Ukrainian victory.