With the transition of power from the Trump to the Biden administration, there has already been signaling of a great shift in U.S. foreign policy. By proclaiming that “America is back” and announcing goals of restoring diplomacy as the focus of U.S. foreign policy, the Biden administration, like every administration, has expressed high hopes for undoing the many foreign policy mistakes of the previous administration, notably in the area of authoritarian regimes. Over the past 30 years, every administration has maintained strong rhetoric in dealing with the authoritarians of the world, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China. Yet, each has failed to match this rhetoric with effective policy. The Biden administration will endeavor to deal with these authoritarians more productively, but it will ultimately reach the same conclusions as its predecessors regarding the immovability of these regimes. The Biden administration should consider a new approach to authoritarian regimes if it is to truly interrupt and effectuate change in regards to these regimes.

It must first be recognized that dealing with these independent authoritarian regimes as an integral part of international affairs and diplomacy is still a relatively recent phenomenon. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, American foreign policy was primarily conceived as being diametrically opposed to the monolithic, Soviet enemy. Although the non-aligned movement maintained a cohesive partnership, many of its member states were actually closely aligned with one of the two superpowers as the bipolar construction left little room for independent actors beyond the United States and its communist adversaries. Thus, with the apparent victory of liberal democracy at the end of the Cold War and the United States’ brief unipolar moment, authoritarian regimes, utilizing violent force and other human rights violations to enforce their undemocratic claims to power, emerged as the new opponent of American foreign policy. With containment no longer a viable strategy since 1991, each administration has endeavored to deal with the many authoritarians of the world through a variety of strategies. The most defining strategies have included forced regime change, gradual influence through partnership, and economic pressures through sanctions. The latter two are still a part of the United States’ active playbook, though authoritarian partnerships remain controversial.

Gradual influence through partnership, the mutual providing of assistance while pushing for the liberalization of power, was embodied in John McCain’s call to be both “assisting but also more insisting” towards these authoritarians. This policy was the original intention behind partnership with authoritarian elements such as Saddam Hussein during the Cold War and marked the United States’ initial post-Cold War relationship with China. But despite many American policy-makers and scholars of international relations anticipating closer economic ties and liberalizations with China as producing its eventual political liberalization, the reforms of Deng Xiaoping instead allowed the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its authoritarian style of governance while enriching itself through a dually command and market economy to this day. Not until late into Barack Obama’s presidency and after several presidencies of closer economic ties with China did many largely abandon this notion and realize that China was truly on the path to becoming the next superpower. Logical in theory, this strategy proves difficult in practice, as it contradicts the authoritarian regime’s survival instinct. When authoritarian regimes already strive to insulate themselves from the democratic will of their people, promises of political liberalization at their own pace are dubious and unlikely to prove true.

Both the Bush and Obama administrations experimented with forced regime change, whereby authoritarian regimes would be forcibly replaced by democracy. But the ongoing War on Terror under George Bush, along with the ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 during the War in Iraq and that of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 during the NATO intervention of the ongoing Libyan Crisis all failed to produce lasting democratic governance. As the present situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya attest, U.S. and NATO-led regime change has only proven to destabilize the target regions by suddenly removing the local strongman. This created a power vacuum and provided an opportunity for insurgency and further conflict.

Only economic pressures remain, utilizing the financial and commercial weight of the United States to isolate these regimes by imposing tariffs, embargoes on goods, or freezing national assets. The United States’ sanctions on Iran exhibit this. Since the Carter presidency, the United States has imposed a wide variety of trade and arms embargoes along with asset freezes on the Islamic Republic. These sanctions were initially in retaliation for the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 and its support for terrorist organizations but later were used to discourage its nuclear program. Lifting many of these sanctions was the main concession for the Iran Nuclear Deal, which illustrates the gravity of these pressures as Iran’s economy has suffered greatly. More recently, Joe Biden maintained Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese imports signaling a continued firm stance in opposing human rights violations by the Chinese government. Though these economic pressures are the most widely used tools to influence authoritarian behavior through isolating and harming their national economies, some critics have instead argued that they ultimately harm domestic firms and businesses more than their targets abroad.

As the perennial boogeyman of American campaign rhetoric, Vladimir Putin’s Russia has persisted as the authoritarian opponent of American interests in Europe throughout the past three presidencies. For over 20 years, Putin’s authoritarian tendencies have only increased with the souring of U.S.-Russia relations, culminating in the 2014 Ukraine Crisis with the blatant seizure of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine along with the more recent suppression and elimination of journalists and political opponents, including Alexei Navalny. While the United States has consistently condemned these actions, action by it and its allies has remained sparse, in part due to overall reluctance to act. War is not on every NATO member’s doorstep, which might explain why only 10 of the 30 NATO member states spend the obligatory 2 percent of their GDP for defense. Yet Russia has shown a foreboding interest in economically engaging with the European powers. Nord Stream II is a massive natural gas pipeline planned to run from Russia through the Baltic Sea and into Northern Germany. It was the profitable product of the dealings of the Russian government owned energy company Gazprom and several other European energy behemoths. Increasing its leverage over its European economic partners and their energy dependency on Moscow, Russia’s actions through Gazprom and similar state owned enterprises thereby discourage America’s European partners from maintaining the economic pressures. Economic sanctions and similar uncomfortable, costly measures will be in vain if these authoritarian regimes continue to succeed in engaging their neighbors in such leverage-seeking projects. To avoid being politically and economically isolated from the European Union, Putin will likely continue to engage in these leverage-seeking projects, slowly but surely deepening Russia’s place in European economics and politics.

Russia’s actions blunt the United States’ approach in Europe while pushing the limits of its own diplomatic malfeasance. Indeed, while the Biden administration has rightfully condemned the recent troop buildup along the Ukrainian border and affirmed the United States’ commitment to Ukraine, it must not allow this sort of provocation to become the norm of Russia’s behavior. Once a provocation is tolerated, the provocateur will then push the limits of toleration further and further. Putin is certainly “playing with fire,” as some commentators have described this action. But unless that fire truly burns, he will be more inclined to continue playing.

While Russia exploits European complacency in the U.S.-European interactions, American diplomacy has shown unwillingness to truly act in the Middle East. The Biden administration has arguably “failed” to back up promises on the campaign trail to punish the Saudi royal family for the 2018 murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul. Rather than impose economic sanctions or some other punishment, the State Department announced that they planned to “recalibrate” rather than “rupture” U.S.-Saudi relations despite a declassified intelligence report directly implicating Mohammad bin Salman, the crown prince of the Saudi royal family. A recalibration of these relations may certainly be within order, but that echoes of the usual failed plans of negotiating with authoritarians. Denouncing the Saudi regime as a “pariah state” and making bold promises of making them “pay the price” for Khashoggi’s murder certainly makes good rhetoric befitting a strong and capable foreign policy. But declining to truly enact this punishment manifests the same mistake as every previous administration. 

As for China, the Biden administration, in continuing with the policy of the Trump administration, has maintained recognition of the internment and cultural erasure of the Uyghur people in Xinjiang as an ongoing genocide. While it is important to denounce these practices for what they are, this should not be the extent of the administration’s response. If these statements are to be taken seriously, there should be some willingness to more firmly impose sanctions or other repercussions without negotiating the exchange of concessions. It would not be surprising to see the CCP at the future negotiating table with the United States, willing and offering to halt and dismantle its internment camps as a bargaining chip in exchange for some other concessions. With reports that Trump agreed over a phone call with Xi Jinping to remain quiet on the CCP’s crackdown on the Hong Kong protests as the U.S.-China trade talks progressed, economic interests with China have already taken precedence over visible human rights abuses. The Biden administration obviously cannot sever all ties with Asia’s emergent superpower. But if the so-called leader of the free world plans to truly maintain that mantle, it must back its moral invocations on the campaign trail with tangible, meaningful responses.

History shows that foreign policy can rarely be conducted “as a moral vanity project,” especially when these government forms persist. We certainly cannot expect ourselves to deal only with states adhering to a certain human rights benchmark. But therein lies the problem. In attempting to stymie these flagrant violations of human rights and international law, the United States frequently finds itself diplomatically engaging and negotiating with the regimes previously denounced on the campaign trail. As the administration confers greater legitimacy on them by seeking a diplomatic solution, these authoritarians sap the democratic values of the U.S. government and blight U.S. foreign policy. The true problem with dealing with these authoritarians is determining the ultimate goal. Shall the United States continue to ignore ongoing violations of international law, holding out hope for gradual conditional reforms, or should the United States forcefully impose its own principles on others? Neither strategy has proven effective.

While the traditional understanding of these authoritarian regimes is that they use their centralized authority simply to expand their power and maintain the regime itself, this does not explain their almost overactive engagement with the world and their neighbors. Rather, the ultimate goal of these modern international outliers appears to be to embed themselves as immoveable fixtures in the international community. As a result, they are unable to be isolated or removed without economically displacing others or yielding greater regional instability. This emboldens and rewards them to violate standards of international conduct, as the international community will defer to a diplomatic resolution rather than endure the pains of a hardline stance. In all of these regions and in the politics of each of these authoritarian states, generating the negative attention of the international community is no longer a deterrent. Rather, attracting the ire of others is an opportunity for them to enact piecemeal reforms to extract greater economic or diplomatic concessions from these liberal democracies who are all too unwilling to take a firm stance and impose economic sanctions. Just as Putin’s political and diplomatic antics never fail to bring him to the negotiating table with the United States, the Biden administration—and its successors—will find themselves continuing to negotiate with authoritarians skilled in exploiting long standing weaknesses in its playbook unless some shift in strategy and thinking occurs.

Many hoped that Trump’s business acumen and tough negotiation skills would change this trend in American foreign policy and produce greater results with both its allies and its obstinate authoritarian rivals. Yet, his “principled realism,” as some have labeled it, did not prove much more productive than previous administrations. In dealing with these regimes, it may already be too late. Bret Stephens recently wrote for the New York Times that for the Biden administration to ensure political stability and prevent the upheavals of another Arab Spring, it must heed McCain’s call to be “assisting” as well as “insisting” towards its authoritarian partners. But maintaining support for these regimes and the regional stability they provide would only be a continuation of the same policies towards authoritarians that have permitted their entrenchment.

Ultimately, for any lasting change to be effectuated with these regimes, the Biden administration must break with the tradition of unwillingness to match assertive rhetoric with firmer policy. Diplomatic interest should not bend to economic interests. Rhetoric must be matched with action and support must be maintained for the dissidents and oppressed abroad who are seeking to change their authoritarian persecutors. With Russia, this means firmly standing with Ukraine and political dissidents such as Navalny in the face of threatening military buildups and Putin’s blatant violence against his domestic opponents. Though effective in power since 1999, Putin cannot extend his essentially life term forever, while his democratic opponents will not be silenced if the United States maintains support for their mission. Assassinations on dissidents should not be tolerated, even with our strategic partner Saudi Arabia, and must be met with the same economic repercussions that are called for during the election. Complacency and empty words reward and perpetuate this unacceptable behavior. There must be a real possibility of freezing assets or imposing other economic sanctions on the leadership of nations that commit such violent acts. As for China, the Biden administration must be especially cautious. The rising superpower will not be rising forever, and the Biden administration must better determine what its goals are with the Chinese state before it stumbles into accepting closer economic ties or implementing a self-defeating trade war.

These policies will not be easy. It is far more difficult to take a stand and forego profitable economic deals, than to simply deplore the moral violations of others on the campaign trail. Indeed, it may be countered that to embark on a new foreign policy of diplomatic assertiveness towards authoritarians would only be hypocritical, especially when America’s social divisions are at their zenith and its democratic traditions of equality before the law are under fire. But for the United States to truly stand for its democratic ideals, it must not make a tradition of diplomatic complacency and empty gestures.