China’s President Xi Jinping announced the world’s largest infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in 2013. Since then, China pumped billions of dollars into the project in an effort to boost its soft power and its hard power abroad. The BRI has two key components: a land-route along the ancient Silk Road and a maritime route. This project highlights China’s desire to expand its global influence and rewrite global norms on its own terms.

Since the early 2000s, the greatest source of Chinese power lies in its economic influence. The BRI capitalizes on this by uniting the world economy under Beijing’s influence. Massive infrastructure projects and government loans are the path to this broader vision. Projects include railways connecting eastern China to central Asia, Moscow, and even Western Europe; oil and gas pipelines in Russia and central Asia; development projects and loans across the African continent; and seaports along the Indian Ocean, the African coast, across Europe, the Middle East, and in the South China Sea. Although not officially included in BRI, similar Chinese projects are expanding into Latin America with large scale investment in Argentine railway systems and the purchase of Brazilian electricity plants. Such projects challenge U.S. interests in the region. These efforts illustrate the extent of its reach beyond traditional Chinese spheres of influence in east and southeast Asia.

Chinese efforts differ significantly from previous large-scale Western projects. Western efforts, including the Marshall Plan, are dwarfed by the scale of BRI. The most notable difference is China’s “no-strings attached” approach. Western aid often is accompanied by requirements for greater government transparency, better protection of human rights, and promises for free and fair elections. Good governance is the prerequisite for development. Through experience, many Western countries learned that attached strings helped “lower the risk of failure.” The strings ensure that the money and resources reached their intended audience rather than simply filling the coffers of the country’s elite. They help to develop the conditions for long-term stability and economic independence rather than permanent dependence on U.S. aid. China operates on a different wavelength: a no-strings attached bundle of aid and investment. The only string attached is deference to Beijing’s authority. The impact of China’s approach is most visible in Africa although it is not unique to this continent. China’s no-string attached approach “has nourished authoritarianism, corruption, debt and the pursuit of economically unsustainable or nonviable projects.” This has allowed authoritarian leaders in many recipient countries to strengthen their control over their nation while binding them firmly to the Chinese Cmmunist Party’s (CCP) will.

The CCP is motivated by a chance to strengthen party control internally while also expanding economically and geopolitically. First, Beijing draws its legitimacy from economic might—a strong economy strengthens the Party’s grip on power. With growth rate declining from double digits in the 1990s to recent lows of around six percent, the BRI has the potential to strengthen governmental legitimacy. For example, Chinese efforts in Africa can be viewed from the lens of “resource extraction and maximizing its economic advantage to fuel growth at home.” When the economy is strong, the Chinese people are less likely to criticize the government thus allowing for Beijing to tighten their grip on internal affairs. Second, by projecting power abroad, China is able to strengthen its geopolitical position. Many of these projects are in strategically important locations, such as the Strait of Malacca and Bab el-Mandeb, and would lead to greater control of the world’s economy. Finally, promoting Chinese soft-power is another key aspect in challenging the U.S.-led global order. Greater access to China’s resources and culture via expanded trade routes can help to achieve this goal.

Yet China’s efforts have not gone without criticism or backlash—criticism from both the United States and recipient nations. Resistance to BRI initiatives began in 2015 when Indonesia and Thailand discontinued a high-speed railway project. In Malaysia’s May 2018 election, Mahathir Mohamad defeated the incumbent prime minister on an anti-Chinese influence platform. He declared BRI’s initiatives were just “a new version of colonialism.” He then went on to cancel two of the largest projects in the country, a gas pipeline and a railway, citing difficulties in paying the cost. In Pakistan, one of the recipients of the largest amount of Chinese lending, debt has soared. This resulted in a $6 billion IMF bailout in May 2019. Many African nations—such as Uganda, Zambia, and Kenya—have started to worry publicly about the increasingly high debt Chinese loans have caused. Although America has long expressed dismay with Beijing’s growing reach, such examples illustrate that criticism is no longer a uniquely Western phenomenon and has expanded to Africa and Asia.

However, the magnet of criticism for Beijing’s global expansion is Sri Lanka’s 2017 default on their loans and the subsequent 99-year lease of their strategically significant port to China. Sri Lanka is the “gateway to resource rich regions of [the] Middle East and Central Asia” and its location enhances “China’s monitoring and intelligence gathering capabilities” in the region. Speculation quickly ensued in which many argued that Beijing was intentionally designing debt traps in order to capture strategic locations worldwide. Combined with the implementation of China’s first forward military base in Djibouti, a strategic location for the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean, some argued that the BRI was simply a front for China’s growing military might. Although many scholars have since argued that Sri Lanka is a unique example, it is only a few years in the past. Even if another such incident is unlikely, it cannot be ruled out due to the increasing debt burden many nations face. Beijing expects to be repaid.

Chinese control of ports and bases in Djibouti and Sri Lanka points to Beijing’s desire to expand Chinese sea power. Of the six key global choke points that have been historically policed by American naval power, China has begun investing heavily in at least half of them. Beijing hopes to re-establish the world order in which they do not have to rely on peaceful terms with the United States to access these vital military and economic choke points. The entryway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Strait of Hormuz currently lack significant Chinese influence. However, the remaining three—the Strait of Malacca, Bab el Mandeb off the coast of Djibouti, and access to the Mediterranean from the Red Sea through the Suez Canal — have been the direction of Beijing’s focus.

Before discussing the three locations of increasing Chinese attention, one other strategic location deserves to be mentioned. For a while, China was considering the construction of a competitor canal to the Panama Canal through Nicaragua. However, China quietly shelved the almost $44 billion project after Panama ceased recognition of Taiwan and began to cozy up to China. As of now, China’s interest in this highly trafficked region seems to be largely for economic purposes. Nonetheless, China’s movement into a region traditionally associated with U.S. influence has added to growing tensions between the two superpowers.

The Strait of Malacca is a vital location to China as almost 80 percent of its oil supply comes through this region and due to its proximity to the South China Sea. Because Singapore, the nation that controls the strait, is a close U.S. ally, the Strait of Malacca is a natural point of potential conflict. It would be easy for the United States and its allies to stop Chinese access thus curtailing the ability of China to import the oil necessary for its industrial machine. As a long-term solution, Beijing is constructing a Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline, a BRI initiative, to reduce dependence on the Strait of Malacca. This could allow China to bypass the strait entirely. However, that does not solve China’s short-term vulnerability in the region as this project would not be ready until 2025 or 2030. To defend its current energy routes, China is assuming an increasingly aggressive stance in the South China Sea and is adding naval bases around the Indian Ocean as part of its ‘string of pearls’ strategy. The ‘string of pearls’ refers to “the network of Chinese military and commercial facilitates developed by China in countries falling on the Indian Ocean between the Chinese mainland and Port Sudan.” This network directly challenges U.S. influence in the region. Although the pipeline provides an alternative to this vital location, China’s continued dependence on the strait and the continued U.S. presence in the region leaves both nations focused on this vital choke point.

Bab el-Mandeb, a vital straight off the coast of Djibouti that links the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, is now home to China’s first forward military base. Persian Gulf and Asian exports bound for Western markets must first pass through Bab el-Mandeb before reaching the Suez Canal. Between 12.5 and 20 percent of all global trade passes through this strait. Only eight miles from China’s base is Camp Lemonnier, the largest U.S. military base in Africa for CJTP-HOA (Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa) and the only permanent U.S. military base on the continent. Some scholars argue that the Chinese military base is the necessary next step in “protecting its commercial interests in Africa against piracy, terrorism, and regional instability.” However, with the rising importance of the Indian Ocean both economically and militarily, the Chinese base in Djibouti should be viewed outside of just the regional context to include a broader regional scope. Bab el Mandeb can be viewed as another pearl added to the growing ‘string of pearls.’

Access to the Suez Canal and a stronger connection with Egypt is also advantageous to China’s broader aims. Egypt has the potential to serve as the “‘hub’ for the BRI into the Middle East and Africa.” For China, Egypt provides vital access to the Arab League—a connection necessary to strengthen relations with the Arab world—and the rest of the African continent. Egypt’s waterways are also key in moving goods and facilitating trade across the continent into the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This will become increasingly necessary as Chinese investment and trade in Africa increases. Furthermore, China will benefit from regional stability, and Egypt is in the best position to assist China in that effort.

Although much attention has been focused on the increasingly aggressive nature of China in the South China Sea, Chinese efforts in strengthening their position along the Indian Ocean and across the Eurasian landmass deserve similar attention. The ports along China’s ‘string of pearls’ in the Indian Ocean are designed to be commercial trading posts to bolster China’s role in international trade. However, “they have increasingly come to play a potentially more menacing role as dual-use ports that can give the strengthened Chinese navy a global reach it lacked entirely just a few years ago.” For centuries, China put a lot of effort into securing its own borders; it lacked the luxury of pursuing security and projecting power on a larger scale. However, for the first time in history, China has been able to turn beyond being a single-ocean and land power to a two-ocean power with the ability to project power and influence over a much larger area of land. The broadening scope of China’s views, highlighted in the BRI, illustrates the increasing role China is playing in challenging and re-writing global norms and the global order.

Indian Navy Captain and former Executive Director of India’s National Maritime Foundation, Gurpreet Khurana, noted that “even while the Belt and Road has a predominately geo-economic motive, it is also being used for [a] military-strategic end.” China’s increasing focus on strategic choke points—key locations for both trade and military movement—deserves U.S. attention. That being said, the U.S. and China are not inevitably doomed for military conflict with each other. There is plenty of evidence and scholarship arguing that such a conflict is, in reality, quite unlikely. But that does not mean that the United States should discount the impact and influence of Chinese expansionist efforts such as the BRI and the ‘string of pearls’ strategy. The United States should remain vigilant, continue to protect its interests abroad, and keep national security interests at the forefront of its mind. The United States should also work to strengthen existing global institutions and seek commonality with China. Both nations can benefit from such progress. Such international efforts promote stability, protect against unnecessary provocations, and help keep the doors of diplomacy and negotiation open.