Introduction: The Fetishsization of the Republic

In the tract Common Sense, Thomas Paine offers the following critique of monarchy: 

‘Where there are no distinctions there can be no superiority, perfect equality affords no temptation. The republics of Europe are all (and we may say always) in peace. Holland and Switzerland are without wars, foreign or domestic: monarchical governments, it is true, are never long at rest; the crown itself is a temptation to enterprising ruffians at home; and that degree of pride and insolence ever attendant on regal authority, swells into a rupture with foreign powers, in instances, where a republican government, by being formed on more natural principles, would negotiate the mistake.’ 

Through this attack, Paine reflects the classic view of the modern republican. Through the lens of this view, there is an assumption of the absolute equality of all human beings. Since this was the natural state of man before society, then a modern republic is the natural form of government. The monarchical form of government, on the other hand, is against the natural state of man. And since the natural order is the creation of God (a la Paley), then the monarchy is against God. This argument also entailed a view of a republic that was quite liberal in its Constitution. In his response to Edmund Burke, The Rights of Man, Paine wrote: 

By grafting representation upon democracy, we arrive at a system of government capable of embracing and confederating all the various interests and every extent of territory and population; and that also with advantages as much superior to hereditary government. 

For Paine, a republic was to be the function through which representation could be chosen. Since monarchs are unnatural and war-prone, they cannot present the true nature of government as an aggregate of economical and social interests. Only a republic, built by a recognition of inherent human equality, could incorporate the many diverse desires of the people into one coherent political polity. 

Paine’s ‘republic fetish’ is not dead. Many Americans celebrated the fall of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese republic in 1911, even though what followed  was to be more destructive. The fall of the Egyptian monarchy in 1953 was also seen by the New York Times as a victory for human rights, even though the regimes quickly turned into a well-oiled authoritarian dictatorship. Even now, there are some in the United States that praise the republican system as being more important than the representative system.

We must take a more nuanced view of what republicanism is, for, most of the time, these beliefs are widely accepted as fact without an examination of the foundations. The first section of my article wishes to examine the foundations of republicanism. The second section wishes to question these foundations in terms of discourse. Ultimately, the ideology of republicanism is flawed, for it ignores the plurality of human experience and creates an illusion of ‘universal satisfaction.’ 

I. 

What is Modern Republicanism? 

Modern republicanism’s foundation exists within the assumption of the theory of the State of Nature. The theoretical grounds for modern republicanism cannot be separated from the methodology assumptions of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was a period in Western Europe from 1641-1790, whereby many thinkers attempted to apply reason in order to solve the perplexities of the human condition. Methodologically, Enlightenment thinkers saw the entire field of knowledge as being united and consistent. Because the entirety of human knowledge is consistent, then there must be one absolute foundation for knowledge. This absolute foundation is undoubtable or, rather, self-contained within the nature of knowledge itself. It is from this absolute, undoubtable foundation that the rest of knowledge must be inferred from. 

The absolute foundation of Enlightenment politics was the theory of the state of nature. The state of nature theory posits that before humans became political beings, they existed in some sort of apolitical social universe. This was thought to be self-evident from the nature of governance, for, before we become citizens in political society, we develop into a society already i.e. our family, our friends etc. Two questions thus arises for political theorists to answer: (1.) what is the identity of the apolitical society? and (2.) why, and how, did an apolitical society develop into a political one?

In this essay, I rely exclusively on Hobbes. This is because he is the true originator of the modern republic. Without Hobbes, the language of Rousseau, Locke and Diderot would be impossible. Hobbes laid the intellectual tools for their analyses, and henceforth a direct examination of Hobbes’s conclusion is an examination of the base. 

The first question, on the nature of the apolitical social sphere, is answered by the first part of Hobbes’s work most famous work, Leviathan. Hobbes believed that man was a thoroughly material being, claiming that there was no separation between the incorporeal (non-physical) substance and corporeal substance. Hobbes then asserts that all human actions are driven by the need to sustain themselves. Because of this, humans are also self-serving, always looking out for their own interest without regard for the welfare of other. But men are also rational, always looking for ways in which to exploit their situations. The state of nature is therefore a state of total war, whereby man’s life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ 

The second question, on the transition from apolitical society to a political one, is answered by the second part of Leviathan. Soon, humans came to see that living politically was advantageous to their survival. Living in a polity would allow them to attain higher spheres of existence: organisation would confer great material wealth, and hence giving them a reliable source whereby their needs would be met. It is through this that governance is formed. The theory described above is the social contract, where the business of governance was beneficial to the whole of mankind. Or, as Hobbes states, ‘‘All Society...is either for Gain, or for Glory; (i.e.) not so much for love of our Fellowes, as for love of our Selves.’  The Hobbesian social contract, however, was unique because, since humans always have a tendency to violate the rights of others, then every right must, in theory, be surrendered. The new government should have absolute authority to impose order and rigidity onto society, as failure to do so may have disastrous consequences. This may seem to be a defense of an absolutely powerful government, but since governance derives legitimacy through society, then this absolutely powerful government still has an obligation to protect uphold its contract to society. 

The social contract would be impossible without equality. If men were unequal, then the inferior men would place themselves under the slavery of the superior ones.  This would be the natural state of politics, and governance would be merely the will of the Superior, not responsible to society. Nevertheless, Hobbes claims that ‘Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that...when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he.’ It is only through the equality that man that the ‘government of the Superior’ cannot exist and be sustained for long. The only true and sustainable government is contractual government, whereby the business of politics benefits every party in the agreement i.e. subjects and ministers. Thus, modern republicanism fails to operate without equality. 

This contractarian view of government is the theoretical grounds of modern republicanism. It was in this ideology that the founding documents of the United States operated in. The phrase ‘it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve Political Bonds’ would be impossible without this contractarian backdrop. 

II. 

The Theoretical Flaws of Modern Republicanism

Modern republicanism, however, presents a very narrow conception of the body-politic that ignores the reality of governance. 

The narrowness of modern republicanism comes in the Hobbesian answer to the first question of Enlightenment political discourse i.e. what is the State of Nature? Hobbes, through answering this, assumes that there is a universal generalisation which could be accurately used to describe all humans. Thus, the assumption that there exists a desirable state of nature is based upon the fact that human nature exists. But does it really? Friedrich Nietzsche, in his Human, All Too Human, claims ‘All philosophers share this common error...they think of man as an eternal verity.’ When philosophers examine the man, they assume that they are examining something unchanging. Nevertheless, in our lives, we see that everything we face changes us somehow: we somehow psychologically adapt to tragedies, or somehow come up with a strategy to complete difficult tasks. Moreover, when we notice our thoughts, we notice that they are all temporary: we may think of something, and then it goes away. When we try to remember such things, they are distorted by our psychological processes. Hence, to assume that beneath this plurality is a monistic ‘human nature’ may be valid only an undynamic interpretation of human nature. 

How does the narrowness of the concept of human nature affect political discourse? The main effect is that it allows for social analysis to be separated from politics. Since human nature exists before governance, then we can imagine a human society that exists before politics too. The divorce of politics from society ignores reality, as both developed simultaneously and interrelatedly. But it also has another effect: it makes politics merely an extension of psychology and the study of human nature. Psychologism in politics is blatantly untrue: the social relationship between two people cannot merely be described by pure psychology, and needs the help of sociological and political concepts (power-relations etc.) in order to provide a better understanding. 

The Hobbesian answer to the second question of Enlightenment Political Theory (why, and how, did an apolitical society develop into a political one?) also ignores the reality of political society.  The theory of the Social Contract assumes that every party is to be benefitted by the business of governance. This is suggested by the current debates over equality of outcome/equality of opportunity. Underlying these debates is an assumption that governments ought to deliver some sort of positive results to all groups of society. In fact, the language of contracts reinforces this: in participating in a contract, both parties gain. A pure analysis of power merely destroys this assumption. Governance is the creation of order. The nature of this order differs due to ideology: there may be a political order based upon the need for a system of racial, or class-based, classifications. Nevertheless, the issue that political order varies with ideology never changes. The unity between order and ideology demonstrates, quite clearly, that the creation of an order is always against someone’s ideological interest. And since ideological interests are based upon cultural/socio-economic upbringing, then the creation of a political order is always, somehow, prejudiced against some socio-economic groups. Thus, it is clear that since order is the aim of governance, then governance is always at the cost of someone else: not everyone can gain, as is assumed by the Social Contract model. 

The illusion of universal benefit is perhaps one argument why people would always attempt to promote republicanism over some other ideology. This illusion of universal benefit, however, is merely theoretical, a belief divorced from the workings of political reality. 

IV. 

Why Should We Care?

How are we to understand these previous reflections and their relevance to society? Firstly, we must reject the republican-fetish to which many of us subscribe to. There is no inherent character within the republic that protects man from slavery and oppression. The social contract, which so many people believe a Constitution to be, cannot be seen as benefiting all groups of society: there are always winners and losers in republics, just as there has always been in all politics. Put simply, the social contract is a fiction. 

Secondly, we must reorient analysis. Perhaps political polemics have become too ideological: If a rebellion were to break out against a reigning hereditary family, then many would flock in to fight for a ‘free state.’ The common view of Middle Eastern countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, tends to also be framed in this way: Saudi Arabia’s government system is an anachronism and must be replaced. Iran’s governments are controlled by irrational actors and cannot be trusted. Perhaps a grain of this is true. But this does not allow us to see the true forces which act within these societies; rather, what we have is a fictional, ideological claim based on our false theoretical belief that a republic is universally ideal.

The aim of all political analysis is to ask the following question: How can we liberate people from oppression? How can we ensure that they are able to lead free lives, whilst keeping in the constraints of boundaries? In order to do this, we must ensure that we evaluate the content of governance, not the mere structure. For structure tells us nothing.